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n OUR OCEAN RAMPARTS. 
A m t r i ~ ~ ~ h a s & k d a a a p r o l g r ~ m o f d d c f e a s a , I n h  
facc of danger fmm without, the Armfi~an p q d e  m arming 
t n d r f t ~ 1 d t h e s a f " y o f t h e r i r c o ~ d t h e ~ o f ~  
nation. 
To provide far total deftnst, om gov-eat has nMhodmd 
or pmjeaed rht c x p d i ~ u t e  of mare tbaa 28 billion d o h  for 
direct wmmmt y i o n  over s period of about thnee ymr~. 
This vast mm provides for the bdaiag up of our hd, sta d 
airfozresariththepttst~'blespced,k&foithesprrift 
expasion of oor i n d d  capacity to prodace Bitpw grins, 
milts d ships. It p d e s  for the rrdmd mmpower to m#c 
t h c d e m s n & o f b o t h i n ~ a n d & g l P J b d f o l ~ e s h ~ o f  
crisis. 
E l t t d d e f ~ m ~ m ~ f c f h n n ~ ~ ~ ~ d m a c k  
and more than the mob-m of the m s d d  rcsou~ccg of dkc 
d o n ,  It means the MI emplopnent of our h u m  ~eso- 
as w 4 ,  It caIls for vision and f d @  in o q d z h g  the cw- 
nomic life of the mdon to its maximum capacity while pre- 
sewing and mengthenhg ow d d c  system Defgast of 
dmmmcy Ealls for wise plomning a d  the f o ~ t i m  of 
policies which look beyond the imtodiPte crisis. And the 
pcms resource of democracy is im vast bdy of fhx md 
determined cithm. 
This haad.book is written for the A r n e r i ~ ~ n  citizen who 
wants to h o w  thc essential facts &at our m t i d  ddf- 
p~whiumommil i tary .rtoEdsasfaraswecnurf~~ 
t h ~ m d a y ? ~ t a r e t h e ~ d a t e g o a l s w e h a v c ~ d  
what have we made toward reachhg those pds? 
W h y a r e w e l ~ i n i e d d p r o d ~ c t i o n , m d h o w c s n w e  
overcame the o W t s  to full prodactid 
I. Our Strategic Porition 
In begidng his survey of a a t i d  dcfeusc, the average citi- 
zaa will want to make o rough mvcntorp of the key facbofs 
which determime our d i a r y  nee&. As a layman, he h ' t  
pretend to Imow the coma cxmpdtia of the United !bat&$ 
Navy, w the tactical usc of fighting p h s  in conjunction with 
land and sea firas, or the proper oqmht ioa  and eqaipmat 
oftheArmy.IZh~areaec$nicslma~whichheiswilling 
to leave ta thc qmts. But he is very dbdy c o d  with 
thc safety of his country md the d d v -  of i ts dtfcose 
sysmn as e whole. He m t s  60 know what the armed forces 
axcmdefendandsvhatnatio~p~thcpapetxpectodto 
l e n f ~ ~ e . A f i o ~ ~ a Z I , t h e ~ u ~ ~ t o k n o w w h a t  
new n-dkay xvspmibilih ha7rt b#n iqmed upon fht 
United States by the swift match of events in Europe and rhe 
F a r ~ I n a n a l * ~ p r n b l ~ h e ~ ~ ~ t h c  
underlying f~crors which ihml and shape wr milirarg and 
naval palicks 
THREE COMRWNG FACTORS 
The inventory must include at least thrae sncb controlling fac- 
tors. Ths? hrst is gqpphy? which detePmines our mec 
p " S i ~ i n * m t o o e h t x d ~ ~ s c c o n d i s t h c b 8 3 a n . ~ t  
ofp~~hE"oped&rZlCEhird i se~n~o ldtheseas .  
Many other basic k r s ,  snch as economic md i n d d  
reso- aright be dded m the list, but for the practical task 
o f ~ t h e n e e d s o f r h e U n i t e d ~ t h e s e m a y b e  
lmnped under the other main heads, 
a. GKN;RAPHY--OUR n~~~ mmm 
Tbe ave~age American c i h  seldom &inks of his couutry as; 
anisland.hamillrary~howefru,we~aninsalarmti~n 
with our frontiers on the sea. Through mast of our history we 
have found security behkrd tb broad acean barriers which 
s e p Q m t c t h e h d  W o f r t b c  ,- 
md Ask W"rtbia our own burdm we hslvt.formd 
n a m d  resources naded for the dwelqmmt d a 
tinent. And within the ~30ntinental island we brwd m- 
supply of th raw m g e d s  essential for mtbd dd--&re 
r o ~ a ~ f o r n l m a s t r h c f i m t i m e , w e f i n d o a r i a w ~ n c , ~  
theatead h m  witbout, 
OUR *INSULARw WSI tl0);l 
The advent of ~ p r o ~ e d  ships and h i g h - p o d  air- 
planes has -wed the ocean barriers and extended the area 
of military operatioas. But the strategic problems bavc m# 
becn. fun-tally altered. As an iaslllar nadori, oar d&m 
sdllliesprimadyonttre9ess.ThismtausthattheNawy~ 
t i n u e s t o b e o w ~ l i n e d d e f ~ f o r 8 n i n n r l a f n a t i o g i ~  
not be defeated if it is abletq oonool b vitaltrademute 
and the sea toitsshomMosteqmmsgfiectbst 
~ ~ ~ b ~ l l ~ e o f b ~ ~ o f ~ n , h a s n o t y e t  
c h a n g o d t h e f h c e ~ w e p r r : a n ~ d o n , d . d t P r w e  
a r e ~ ~ t o d i r e c t r # w c % o a l g i f w e l o s c d o f  
t h e ~ o n d 3 i r ~ e s ~ t h e W ~ H e m i s p h c r e .  
nos, if the objecrivcs of the armed forces art medy to 
dEJfend.the c0ntia-d 'Ilnired Stam snd its appmhw and 
to uphold our pliciep in the Western Hemisphere+ g q p p h y  
has gmtn IIS priceless adntral advan~ages. It has pfraced w in a 
@on tm d c f d  our moist vital -the Caribbean Sea, the 
"life lintn at Pmama, md the Atbdc and MC a p p d e s  
ta the Nor& American roetineat-by txltans of our own armcd 
foms. But gmpphy lJso d c t s  o w  a d  of action in other 
aress. h the P d f k  Ooearq our mdying possessiom m a d  
beyond the sphtre of U. S, naval snprernacy, with the Philip 
pines lying n d y  5,000 miles beyond the great f d e d  Base 
at H a d  Olu tiny sit Guam, some 3*300 milts west 
of Honolulq k m o o d n d  by the Japmesc madated islands, 
andtherout%fromtkEtC~~~mSingaporeandcheD&East 
hdiw extends amdm 2,800 mila Yoko- on h e  other 
hand, is only rgya d m  from Guam In the South Ahtic ,  
d i s t . anscposw~hBI"dpTOblemi fweYad~rode fend  
the long f o ~ ~ d - m i l e  east clodlse of South Armria. The 
pra&dzcmwiIiwantmmake a t h o ~ ~ q h ~ ~ ~ ~ e y o f  these 
-%w w d m m s  m o m  g q m p h i ~  position, but for 
the pnrpascs of his rough invcatory it is sdlicient to note these 
three rrmin arew of defense, &own h our f ~ n t k p k e  map. 
& WE W C E  OF POWER 
~ b c r c c o l l d ~ ' f s a m ~ - v i n l m & ~ d w c v u  
bef~f~.Haditaatbecafor&eridrics of Empq our historic 
steruity might b m  bear c h a l l e  m y  dmes during the 
biacoeeath century, despite the width of the two octatur. 
h g h m  most of our hiaoty o w  anntd forces hnve beon 
mucb~o~weaktomoanaymajorthteartaf~onfrom 
overseas. In 1 8 ~ 3 ~  when we proc- the h f o m  I lodm, ' 
ehc U M  States was a nation of only xcqtwmo psoplc; om 
a r m y w a s ~ e ~ t b a n a m i l i t i a f ~ t c ~ ~ l l d ~ n r ~ ~ ~  e a d d  
of some ~~~ old higates sad a xnisdautoos 7 ~ G C  of pri- 
vataers, auring the decades after the Civil War, the Navy 
d&od dmast to the ~~ point, at a t h e  when the 
fowvful E w p  nations were d g  om vast mpka ha 
Afri~11ondgcmdqthcird~eionoverlargcpaftsOfAsEt, 
And yet in the nin-th century m a d d c  for empire dw 
Ammicas done & mmuchd 
Until recently, the average cisizEn hss dm the Menroe 
h m h c  pretty much for p t e d .  like tht Athdc, it has 
becn accepted without question. But mxt h i s t o h  tbt 
the~ceo fp [rweracros s theseashashadasdm~do  
with keepkg Empmn nations from inrerfcring in the West- 
cm H-here as anything we have doat CMXS&CS. 
We are familiar with the s o y  of haw George Gumbg, the 
Btitish Foreign Secretary1 w m  s confidential letta in r823 
to Richard Rush, the American Miniooes in London, pmphg 
an A n g l - u  ~ d e ~ d i n f  to ketp the Holy AUi= 
ance from restoring Spanish s o d p t ~ '  over Latin PLfiaePica, 
and how John Quincy A h  won the sapport of President 
Monroe for a ddaraam by dw United Seam i d *  Monroe 
rejected a British allimce ta enforce hio Jhtrinq but wel- 
comed Bri&h support in keeping. other E m p  mtlw 
from meddling in the New World. Wc noed not go h o  d~ 
longer story of Enropean ri&es, except to point opr that 
since dke end of the Napoleonic wars this country and thc 
entire Western Hemisphere have benefited from the bdauce 
of power. Great Britain was tho only nation which wnld chal- 
lenge h e  security of the New World. BUS except for th 
V c m z u b  bwndary dispute of 1@5+~6, and the M * "" 
e p W e  in M&co in ~864, which Brit& ccledrmcd, sbe b 
becn conshmdy friendly. As long as Britain conmllad the 
~ ~ g b a d n o t h i n g t o f ~ h m a n y n a ~ m o n t h e c o n ~  
o f E m ~ I n t h e F a r E s s t , a s i d l a r b ~ ~ o f  p w e r p  
v e n d  any m e  nation from gaining. masmy of rhc Pacific 
So for nearIy a century the free nations of this Hcdphm 
fwnd it pdb1e ro develop their continad bland wirSroat 
hngc aImalnam Our Own defeasa needs &ul relatidy 
small t l d  r9r+ when World War I theatend to b y  the 
b h  of p e r  in h m p a  9 entering Ehc war in 1917, 
America helped to "mr¶ the bahcen d secorc: an Allied vic- 
tory; by rething h to  it3 "Splmdid idation$' wfien the fighting 
ceasad,dreUni~Seas~fPil6d~playanypeaIpartirmbdd- 
mg a new order or pmmhg the old Then for rwart~r years 
w ~ b a d o a r & e f ~ ~ o n a ~ t ~ ~ t i m i a ~ a n d A s i a  
which we blithely assamod w d d  Iast ind&hlyY Onee again, 
o u r d p ~ o ~ ~ a n d e o n e o c e a n n a v y s e e m e d r c a -  
somb1y usidepaon far m t i d  defmse, As long es she 
fi.icndly9 fsmih b&cm of pwer i-edncd, they probably 
were "q for the p r o ~ m  of condnental UnabEd 
Sates Pad our psition in the Westrm Hemisphere. But the 
moment dm old h h c e  was thmtmed with destmcltic)a, 
thcy ~eemed-spd were-mdly iasdmpae. 
A m c $ c a a t . ~ ~ w s s b l a w n t o t h e P P i n d s m & e 6 8  
days of rg40  which marked the downfall of Norway, Den- 
mark, H O W  Bclgim and France* For perhaps the &st tiwt 
i n h k l i f e , t H e ~ A m e r i c a n c i ~ a s k e d h i m s c l f $ 1 6  
qpestic#1: What would happen if Nazi Germany should cap- 
tnre the British Navy? 
3. SW, POWER 
B u t m r d A m c r i c a n s h d b ~ w ~ t c o f i h c ~ ~  
of Bri- sca power. In the htc 1880's an dmmq middle-aged 
o f b r  in the United States Norvy had began to study dw 
impommeof seaprrwerasafactiorinhiistorydtoanalyze 
t b e ~ w s s w r s f i a t ~ ~ ' s r i s e s s s m d d ~ ~ 3 i i 9 ~  
m1sAEfrrsdThaycrMaBntl ,Inr8~hemteabmkded 
T&e 1njkems of Sea Polurw Uptm HZttory, and bnfoic he died 
in I914 hi5 ductrin~p;~ had gone far fmmd i5tbdhg dlu 
p w t h o f a n o d e r n ~ n a P o l l ~ *  
] [ t l t h e ~ a u r ~ ~ h a s v P r i c d w i d e I p a t & $ ~  
pwids. Dnr3ng the early years of the Rtpablic, dafmse of oar 
s h o m a n d ~ w a t e m w a s ~ d s s t R e p r i o l n r y ~  
o f t h t N a v y ~ W e d i c d ~ m d g n n ~ m d f l a ~ ~  
~eseodefendoorpohgdharbom.Dnriggthecraof 
the N a p o I d  wars, however* we bailt ht seagoing shipd 
which fought well pga3llsr the pawesful British  nag^ in Exlfo- 
p t a n w a l w s a a d ~ ~ ~ t f p e ~ p ~  Attheend 
o f t h e C i o i l W a r w c h d o n e o f & t m a w ~ n a o i r s k  
F x i s t t n c e * t h a t t i r e e , t p U t i t ~ n o t d ~ b ~ t a w -  
eighties, when Mdum's iduenc began to be felt, that we 
~ e d t o r h e i d c a o f b 2 3 ~ q g n r s e a p o w g a . A ~  
M h  cwmw dla icar&t d d e ~ ~ c  of a p t i d  intcmq 
prtldarlp tFadF Pnd Shipping, d be wmmd only by con- 
u ? o l o f e h e ~ d ~ e f f ~ e c o n m I o f t h t s e a s d d b e  
d d y  by e 61- "+It of tPhiag the dmzk'' 
CreatBr ica inbad lq~sachaf l6e t . Inbreycors  
b c f o r e t s e W o r i d W a t , t h t ~ N ~ n r y ~ t h t m ~ h l t ~ -  
I I f u l i n ~ r w a r l d . I t ~ d ~ l i f s ~ d a ~ t m p i r e w h i c h  qmmd the globe. It p c a d  r tbtivirtg cmmem, and w d l b l e d r h e t i n y B r i t i s h I s l m t o ~ ~ ~ o f p o w c s , ~ n d  to enfom tbcir Pax B&mmba Pkid whepbc-r the average American knew it or not, oar aara prdlcsn of def- in the Adantic a d  the -bean was simpMed by British sea power. 
It was trtre that Gmwx a d m d  and T h W  RoameIt 
h a d a l f c a s y q p I i e d ~ ' s ~ d b c g r m m b ~ a  
~ f l s e t . B a m ~ ~ W a x p t q t h e U . S . N a ~ f ~ ~ ~ ~ )  
b e t t c t ~ a p m r ~ ~ b & h d G r e r r t : ~ a n d h p  
rial Gemmy. 
A f b C F t h C W O f i d W ~ ~ t h e ~ ~ ~ h a d ~ ~ r w e  
r3 
power had hdpd to defeat G e m m y  md the remnants of the 
Geman Navy had been d b d  at Scap Flow, But Brimin's 
flea bad d e r c d  heavy losses, while the United Statcs and 
mother newcomer-Jap-had forged ahtad If he United 
States had completed its huge 1916 b d & g  program, fi 
cumtry would have pepheed Brlmin as ttie grcamt naval 
p ~ ~ p ~ . B u t t o s p o i d a c O s d y ~ t r a o c , P ~ ~ n t ~ -  
ing in 1921 called the WWPsfiing Wereme, which pro- 
d u d  tht && naval W t i m  q p m e n t  in W r y ,  The 
fmww 5-5-3 d o ,  tixed at Wadhpm, was baSed on the 
a strength of the lading navies at that: time, Britain 
d c S ,  orch haping 5 tom to J a p ' s  3. The s t p  
mm-later mded in London-bed until r936, when it 
expired after being dcaowcd by Japgg, 
ME ERA OF NAVAL M A T l O P t  
Drrring thwe *P,efd*' years k e e n  two wars, the aver- 
qp American cirizen was not too much c o d  by the fail- 
oreofCoqgresswbddapao~y,"rhatis,@tywith 
Britain, as provided by the Washingon treaty. When J a p  
invaded ~~ in rgp, he m k  no- d probably 
a+ President R d r ' s  h t  naval expansion p m p m  
d u : m x t y ~ . H e ~ n o t i c d l t h s l t r h c U . S . f l e e t s t d  
t h t o t t g h t h a ~ C s a a l t o d l i s h a f l e o t b a s c i n t h e  
WC. But be probably nevw stop@ to @we out &it the 
Na~pcloaldorddnatdointBePa&c,orwhatdhap 
pcnifBritishscapowersbQuldbesuMydcstmydmthe 
h t i c  
T h c A d m i t a l s a t & ~ N a v g ~ t , a f r o a r s c , M  
worked out their theoretical defense p h  d p-tod their 
b l ~ ~  for a - c d  flu$.'' But not am the Admirals 
had: thought of mything 90 on-1c ss: dcsmceion of the 
Bxi& Navy daring their period of active &a. In ~934 the 
A % n i r a l s a s t b d d y f o r ~ t y ~ d C o ~ ~ d o d b y  
a u ~ r o r n e w s h i f w # b t i n g t h c f l ~ a p # t h t a t r p ~  
lev& In 1938 CoryBress voted andm 30 per #ot kW4?SU, 
regneded by thF naval exprts as %mmbly a&qtld boa- 
d c f w  ag&m my pmnl enemy which oooEd rhm bi8 
foregcga .>- , 
T h e i m p o ~ t p o i n t t 0 n o t e h t h . t ~ g p a t s d . ~  
A&r& sonld not foresee s situation in which tbs W# 
fleet might dbtpp" or fall inm the h d s  of a p m d &  
enemy. During zhese ''pedd" years the Unitad !%BB %@! 
ablo to keep its in the Pdconly becausetbeAdpPlt3R 
secmd ssrfe from danger. But the AtlPntic w a ~  'Wen dp-@S 
I o n g a s B r i t i s h s e a p o w c r g t o o d a s a b d t r b ~ ~  
a n d ~ m u i w . w h e n t h e b n f f e r w a s t h r e a t m * d , d r e ~  
p l a a s o a w h i c h o u r w b o l c s y s t e m o f d c f ~ w n s ~ ~  
llK4shed away. 
T h i s u w t h e s ~ f ~ ~ g p r o s p e c t w h i & ~ a f r o r t # d t f r o ~ ~ -  , 
a g e c i ~ ~ w e l l a s t h e ~ i n t h d h l r b d t a t ~ c r f  
I*. The first-class ortcscean navy wos no less powerfrJ far. 
IlddmmrthaaithadbecnEnJ'~11~,badrsdrmedtbt 
N n z i P f m i ~ ~ ~ E ~ ~ p t ~ d t h e ~ a d e n ~ o f ~ d l t c r a  
tl lG~eflterofBritishseapwer~+dttbep"ibIe~ 
sions of the fleet dmast beyond nmpith 
Asheloaksatthenew prospect, many a c i t i z e n m s t f d t h  
h i s ~ e n m r y h a P r a i s e d z l l ~ r e q u d o n s t b a r r i t ~ ~  
What if Hitler should d y  saccecd in d e s ~ q i n g  dte 
Brirish Navy? Would oar insular padtion still shield *auo 
w o d d ~ ~ ~ ~ b c ~ d q e r o f ~ i n ~  
defend our A&dc amst liauE bef0~6 the '-w 
~ l F f o w r s e e t t f L c ~ o f a r r r f l ~ ~ ~ i n L a t i a  
~ - L < m r ~ a d u p t c t o p m t c c t t h e I a n g , ~  
eoastl inedofBrazu A n d w y , w h t b a ~ h t h e  
~ i f t h e N a v y i s f a c e d w i t h a s e r i o u s ~ i n t h e A t l P n -  
H Should we keep o w  fleet on gtlard at Hawaii or d it m 
%gapme ta chaclr Jap's h a n c e ?  
In searching for an answer to thee qudo~ts, the practical 
Ameri~~f3 will examine hk atlas more ciddlythan he hash  
the past. Orzr fmtiqiecc map cm~eys amme ides of the stia- 
tq$c problem. It shows d d y  the dimmas which seill sepa- 
rate Amdea from Enrope and W. But it slsb tows that we 
hmedrreevibalrsreasofdef~#LCE10f~p~tlsep- 
rate*1c~lsofOfm 
THE AllANTIGCllrR1BBEAN ZONE 
T h ; f i n r - i ~ m ~ ~ a r t h ~ t t . n t * , ~ d i n ~ f r o m ~ n m l n n d  
t o t h G n o r t h ~ ~ n c ~ o f S a a t h ~ a n d e m b ~ t h e  
chin of islPads which ring the Gdbbeaa SeP. Before the war 
wediddtworry~ch&omthtA~~rbSwehavFsccn,  
oar main bade fleet was stationed inthe M c ,  laping only 
P s d  quaimi h & A-C, Ehrt when Denmark, H o h d  
and Frame were aampisd one after mother by Gcrmmy, we 
b c g a n w ~ ~ l l ~ t K h a e a a i g h t ~ b o t h e i r ~ ~ i e h e  
W ~ H ~ ~ ~ t o t n l t e s t . e p s t r r s o c n r e t h e  
to om ywcm. mitiart frog** 
M i l i r a r y a n d d ~ w S 1 e n t h c y s t n d y s n y a r e a a s  
r r ~ e ~ o f W a r v r r e ~ * a t t ~ ~  
* ~ b e d m ~ ~ , m ~ ~ ~ f t ~ o ~ ~ g t i o m o f  
PrmBd forms, whether on land, sea ar in the air. Control of 
~ k e y p o s i t i a r m i s ~ b o e h ~ ~ a n d d e f e n s e . r n ~  
a v G r h o I d s ~ i s & l c m ~ ~ y ~ ~ ~ o f  
~ d h i B f ~ h r n a E k h n e 0 ~ r h C ~ ~  
c s p t d p y t . ~ w i z h ~ a s ~ r a d i ~ d s ~ d s  
d ~ o c c i o n i P l i m i a d m h ~ ~ d 3 , 0 0 0 n t i l e a  
With these factors in mind, you can see at once the strategic 
importance of naval bases in the Atlantic area. In the north 
(see the above map), Iceland, Greenland and Newfoundland 
form potential stepping stones along the shortest route between 
Europe and America. Julianahab, on the southern coast of 
Greenland, lies only about 800 mila north and east of St. 
John's, Newfoundland, and about 1,800 miles from Boston. 
Iceland, occupied by British and Canadian troops after the 
Nazis entered Denmark, Zies 450 miles east of Greedand. Fog, 
ice and snow would make air md sea bases diicdt to stab- 
lish on any of these stepping stones. But the pesslbdity that a 
h d e  power might set up such b a ~ ~  cannot be ruled oat. 
Naturally, it would be a matter of grave concern to tho United 
States and Canada. 
The permanent Joint Board on Defense set up by -dent 
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King in August 1gg0 
was: given rhe task of presenting plans for "the defense of rhe 
d W of the Western Hemisphere." Under the destroyer- 
n a d b a w ~ c o a c l ~ i n ~ c r  ~w,theUnitcs 
States has eot only acquired sioes far a m d  bsse at: St. John's 
Ncwfomdb6, but a h  fadit& f a  an air base on Ar@ 
Paniasuls sad p u d  for an "Army Defensive Forcei5 nearby, 
b w l  of the narrhern AtIandc mate by tht United Seatw 
and Canada would make it cWcd4 if not j.upsible, for m y  
amdchg force to gain a f00choId. 
DEFENDING THE PANMjlA leANAL 
The mthm m r  is even more vital to the Befeest of tfie 
United S;~ates, as it embrace3 h e  srmaGgic appMaches to the 
PanamaC9ma5dspossiblefohzrtcanalromeacrcwsNii- 
r a p  (see map opere). T a  a considerab1e dcgrpe, the real 
safety of the United Stms r?ests on the mobility of tbe flett, 
and itg a b ' i  to move freely bmvecn the Adantic and the 
Pacific. The Caribbean approache are shielded by the m m d  
M e r  of the West Indies idan& which describe a p t  &- 
ckk ezte~ding h m  off the cease of FIorida m the northern 
roast of South America, The chid passaga through this bar- 
rier have betn d o h w d  by Unired States bases at Guan- 
rj5aamo, Sm Juan, hef t0  Rim; md St. Thomas, in thc 
V I  Islands. But south of St. Thomas h e  island pamssions 
of BTiE&jIL, Fmcc and Holland dot thc long h e  of the Lesser 
AntUles dl the way tu the cease of Venmeb. Noae of thest 
caontrjtg has ever built ht-tlass naval bases in the West 
Pndk, bxrt Briblin bas secondary naval stations at Bcrmnda 
a d  Jam& Fraau: has a snuhn at Mmkique and Hahnd 
tias anoaFmc;r at Cmwpo* The Dutch klm& of Cumpa and 
nra qecidty imporrant mcat of Vtaemda's 
k g c  oil supply jS shipped there for storage or r e h i q ,  This 
sadern line of &dm&, PS well as rhe approaches m Sodern 
F 1 0 r i e a v i o ~ d t h e ~ m b e c o v e F e d b y d l e  
tpew~gccrzPedin.diaW*G~Bfitairt ,  
7 0058  
REP- 
Here is a smmnaty of the sites chosen fox United Stam bases 
in the so& secmr (scc atso map, pap 19): 
* 
Bemluda: Land and seaplane bases, d station, md 
storage space for explosives. 
f m  Miticary airfields and naval dockyards to be 
nsed joindp by the United States and 
Brirain. 
% Laeia: Seaphe base ( t g  d c s  south of F m ~ h  
M d q u e )  and Iand plane: base. 
- Land and seaplane bases, for the most part 
for patrol ~pdrons.  
~~~ Lsnd and =plane bms, dm for pm1 
vh- 
Bdlwmm U. S. patrol v d  will have nse of Abrs- 
ham Bay, Mnyapna IsEgnd. Wet' base 
sixes arc being considered. 
Naval on thc aorchwest peninsula, and 
an army air bslse in the center of the 
*d 
Wknthesebasesaredevelopd,rh~gicpagitionsfthe 
U n i t s d ! k a t e s s h d d b e p d y ~ . ~ ~ & e  
Caribbtpn d d  pddPy be dcnicd bo my enemy naval 
f o r c c b y s ~ y d ~ d i e e t s a p p o r o e d b y L a n e f  
dsean ircEadt~g f~ tBanafbybas t s , 'The trPdcof  
ddmdbg the entirt Adan& ma w d d  be more tiitli* par- 
~ P g B i L l S t a ~ ~ f p ~ w e r ~ w h i c h ~ b s d o m -  
h t  ia Ean,pc. But &my e x p m  are not &med by the 
prospects of direa i n d o n  of the United States, Thcy are 
more concerned by the pmxlbility of petration in Somh 
dhncrica. 
THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ZONE 
The vast area bqrond the '"balge" of Brazil pmsmts a very 
diierent problem. A glance at the map on pap  23 will show 
why. En the first place, the average United States citizen thinks 
of k i n  America as lying d k d y  south, whereas most of the 
continent is d y  east of Detroit. This mesas that the 
~l~srpint:inE~kd~mAfri~8tfranitistomost 
of our bases in the Catibbtaa. As the map shows, Natal, h 
B d ,  is ody r , h  d e s  from Freetmq on the west cast of 
Africa, and about the same dimme fmim the Gape Vexde 
Islaads, which belong to Porngal. Looking north and west 
from Natal, it is 2,3m d e s  to Puerto Ilico, 3,cm miles to 
Panama and 3,500 miles ra Norfolk, Va. h k i n g  south f m  
Nand, it is &out & to Ria dt Jamb, 2 , p  miles to 
BU~RI~S Aires and nore than 3,630 d m  to thc Saaits of 
Magellanm Cape Town, Soutb Africa, is 3?6m miles from the 
River Plate, while l?mam is 5~ miles aad New York 5,800 
des .  
Dinaace, herefore, is s primmy hcmr ia the strategy d 
the South Atlamk. But ss the a h  has ahdp disc- 
the problem of defending South Amorico hemms d y  acute 
only if the British Navy is destroyed or capcud If D h  w 
Freetown or Librtdc i9 not in dre hands of a ptmriat may, 
orifnahomileWefleeteanma&&t~th.eWestetn 
H*herehlirdemfear.Onthewherhnnd,ifMhsc~ 
power shonld be destroyed lrnd the Axis powers &odd gain 
conmi af those key p i a m  in Africs, the probkm 
wotlld become far marc: Mdt. A hostile fleet operating from 
African h w d d  be in a position to M m g t  cam01 of the 
adre South Adantic, and a, dmatm the d t y  oil h e n -  
* U m p y  a d  Brazil. The United Stares, on the other 
hand, could operate in the Sonth Atlantic oaly if the fleet had 
access m wdeqaippd and fartZfiwf bass m Bm& Uruguay 
aaa-tiea 
SOUTH AMERICAN DEFENSES 
At the present tirm no S o d  American country has any h- 
class n a d  base eapab1t of handling caphl ships, ahm& car- 
riers or htavy h. In fact, none of these conn9i.e~ a 
modern navy. Argentina possesses the largest navy jn South 
America, but i e ~  flea eon&ts of m o  old bad&ps, two light 
&rs, 16 dmmytrs, three s a b h e s ,  and a few small 
c d  & 
Btazil boasts a fleet of a b u t  2 0  combat ships and 18 small 
a.mdIiary craft. AItqcther, the Latia fhericaa rcpnbfics in 
1940 had o* r I r cornbat ships with a t d  t o w e  of a63,ooo, 
more than half of which was technically "obsoletq9' that is, 
more than meny yeam old. 
%eral seMladary bases or naval s&ms am xmintaincd by 
the east roast republicsIics Brazil has a mall  naval d m  at Pad, 
north of the % d ~ "  and a navy yard at Ria de Janeiro. Wm- 
pay has n sfnall rmy yard at Montevideo; across the River 
Plate Argentina b s  irs chief base at La Plata, with mother d l  
ad011 at Pam Bdpno,  swcral hnndred miles south. As a 
d t  of d i m s h s  b m w m  h e  United !3tata and the South 
American pve- begPtn in the smmex of rw, some 
of these faditiea may be expanded and new bases established+ 
Irkmad of pmpoiag to 'lease*' bases from Latin American 
~ ~ l ~ ~ ~ t b e U ~ S t a l c e s ~ ~ a p h u n d e r w h k h  
a l l b 4 9 e s w i l l b e c p n m r h c ~ ~ u s t o f  d t h ~ M a n  
repn6fia. According to this plsa, tach American repubIic 
wodd 00- on ies own t enbry  wharevtr base me n d a d  
for mtinarrrl defense, oh- to bc open m all other American 
' epacx  The Unicad h t e s  snrnds ready to provide techaid 
a a d ~ c i u l a s s i s t a n c e ~ a i d o f t h i s l r i b d i n a z s a t y .  
HOW MUCH CAN WE MRlrlD? 
But when additional bases are bailt and fortEad, the Noah 
Americancitb;enandhisLatin~caandghbarwilld 
SOUTH 
A M E R I C A  
L A F R I C A  
face pqdexing p r o b l m ~  in this area* Some South Americans 
h frankly " p d  their doubt about the abfty of &e 
~ h i t e d ~ c r # s # , d c f c ~ d t h c e n * ~ a n d s w ~ : ~ a h  
Amdam BPve echoed their doubk 
Aerodhg to one tfieory advanced by several Unias I*litPbts 
tfft.iacrcs, this mumy s h d d  adopt s -"spw def- 
program as an a l m t i v e  to deferis of the mdre Hakpher~ 
Wc s h d d  be plepared 2b defend all of North Amdes, they 
s s y , s s w e l l a a M e x i c o , ~ ~ d t h a ~ b c P n ~  
tnr. Bnt we & d B  not try to d e b d  the southern W of 
South America. Iascd, we should draw aa arc with a r a d k  
sap, of r,~oo mila from the Panama Cad,, or perhap a line 
rumring from tht bnlge af Brazil due west: to the P d c  
B d d  ehis line we s h o d  canam- our major defense 
prepamtiam, and not worry too much PboUt the rest of South 
~ e a . I f t h e I & r t i s h f l e c t i s s t i l l m ~ l o f  dw Adantic at 
tfit end of the war, W"C w0o3t have m worry abut Lgdn 
~~8; i fGermsnyTRinsr , t f seEeisrvot~muchwe~do 
&out Argmtina ad Umga%y, snyway. 
A few militarg qem stport &is bid concept of 
defense, which on aar paeritiOn.Btztath* 
the h g c - m o j ~ - m j e c t  th idea abr "piid' defense: 
a s ~ d f i i n t h e b o f ~ - d r y d h  
- r h q p s r s p t l t i t g t & ~ % w i e p r a e l p ~ , t h a t  
k c o a I d m # e ~ e n b e ~ a m c h h ~ d & 8 s a y  
E n n , p e s n d o n w e r e d o w e d t o p i n a f ~ m t h i s H d  
sphere, we. &odd be pbcd in a &tbk cgdcnsive poddm 
P r o m t h e ~ y m i l i t a r y p o i n t o f ~ , E e ~ d d ~ a t n o 5 t a g  
~ u s f o r a s m p m n i t t b B a s b ~ o b a ~ e b $ 9 F  
2 n c c r r e a f ~ o r P c t a a s i n V d a E c t u d o r .  
From the p o I M  point of viewv toocand that cplllf be 
i p m d  in d y z i f i P  dq daf~a~btbe  Quwtm-sphere pro- 
g w m m d d c a i l f o r a n e w ~ d t f r e M o s v o e D ~  f 
N a d y l  if we gave up tho idca of defending any batin I 
i 
face p e r p k g  problem in this area. Some Sonth Amtrim 
have f d y  express4 their doubt about the ability of the 
United Serajes so defgld tho en& continccrt; md m m ~  N d  
Americans have echoed their doubts. 
Ac~rding to one theory sdvanced by severat Udadl Stntw 
w r h q  this c m q  shoutd adopt a ' Q m r t e r - g p h e r ~ ' ~  
p r o w  as an d d v e  to defense of the mth Hcmislphere. 
We should be prepared to defend all of North Amuicp, they 
say, a s d l  as MdXiOO, Cemd America and the Cmibbtm sac- 
tor* But we s h d d  na try to defend the southern half of 
South America= h e a d ,  we should draw an arc with 1 mdms, 
my, d r , F  miles frcm the Panama Canal, or perhaps a h e  
ru~ning from the bulge of Brazil due west to the P&c. 
&higd this line we should concentrate our major defense 
pyxmtiolls, aad not worry roo much about the rat af ofSouth 
-ria If the British deer is st i l l  in oozltrol of the A h i c  at 
the end of the war, we wonk h e  rn wony about Lath 
A m e r i ~ ~ ' ~ i f ~ y w i n s , t h m i s ~ s o t ~ m u c h w e c a n d e  
about hgentinn a d  Uragaoy, anma 
A few mili#rry clcparrrr aaqrpnrr dlis limired concept of 
defcm, *h rssnr au uur p p q h i c d  paeltion, But 0th- 
rhc ~-~~ tba ids ab a defense 
a s d a n g e r w g ~ f a t i l e i n t h a ~ o f ~ y d d e s "  
~ o s s r e a ~ ~ s t w ~ ~ i p ~ ~ , d r a t  
i t d - m b e ~ d h d ~ d t h $ t i f m y  
EhmpmagtionwrrcallOwedtogoina~IdiathisHd- 
sphere, we A d d  be placed k s diikdt -ye p o s i h  
F m  the p d y  a d b y  p o h  d vim, is would be aImost as 
dangmws for us to permit the wmbhhmmt d a M e  bast 
i n c m t d B r a z i l o r P # u s a r i n V ~ u & o r ~ o r .  
From the politid point d view, om-ad that can$ be 
ignored in aaalping military defmse-thc Qwmr-sphere 
gfam would d for a ncw ddhition of h e  Monroe Doctrine. 
NaWy, if we gavc up the ides of defending any Latin 
OUR INDUSTRIAL STRENGTH 
"We hove many of the 
resources of modern 
industry within our 
borders - . . -* 
6 W Y  BLOCK - MATERIALS MPORTEP WOM M WESTEW HEMISWERE 
American nation south of Brazii, we should have to ;trim o w  
clipicmdc sails as well. Same believe that this would be a 
senulble policy; but in effect it would rev- the whole m d  
toward P a n - f h a i ~ g ~  solidarity. 1Wore0ver~ it would amount 
to an invitation to Eurqem dictaom to step in when and 
where they please south af our i m a g h y  line of defense. 
At the opposite extreme from rbie Quarter-sphere tkm- 
are &me who believe that our def- lies not merely on the 
outermost bomdarics of the Westere Hemisphere, bat in 
Empe as d L  The best defcnstg they argue, is to stop the 
dictatars there before &cy gct 8 foothold in South America 
and use it: as a jmping-off p]arce for an o w k  on US. 
LATIN At+4FRICA AS OUR SOURCE OF SUPPLY 
For the mmenr, however, the citizen is concerned p r i d y  
with the ixmnedhe strategic pblem.  Them is one more con- 
sidcrah which mast be taken inxo account; this is the need 
for materigSs essential to our dtfmse indmtzy. We have many 
of the resoma for modern indumy within o m  o m  borders, 
and yet then ape s number of srrategic raw materials which 
we must impart from abmad. These indnde such minerals as 
tin, m q p e s e  (4 in making steel), clwtxnh (for alloys), 
antimony (fa chemicals) and m v  (for explosives and 
drugs). Robber and hemp are other raw materials which w e  
now fmpm from dnc Ease hdiss aud thc Philippines. If out 
prewar sources of supply should be cat off, we should be 
hard pressed ro h d  the necessary mataids on short notice. 
Latin Anxzria, however, is potentidy rich in many of these 
strategic mami&, soma of which a u l d  bc developed with aid 
from the Unized States. These include m p e s e  from Brad 
and Cuba, tin and t q p n  from Bolmia, antimony and mer- 
clary from Mexicot quav~z from B d  and chmmire from 
Cuba Most of our rubber comes fmm British Malaya and the 
h;rch @sst Indies, but B d  4 #I be thc mrId's 1&g 
mulce of supply, and new plantations- might be dcveIOped 
there in seven or eight years. For these reasom Hdsphere 
defense is not d y  vital to the United States, bot a mattcr of 
common concern 'ta our Lath American mighbam 
THE PACIFIC AREA 
if dhmae is r controlling factor in tfit strategy of Hemisphere 
dtfemq it is evca more impmt in the P d c .  Phis becomts 
apparent from a glance at the map on page 29. The d £la& 
Mercator projection rnap is misleading as a guide to the Pscific 
Ocean, This is b u s e  it fails to sbow the progressive shorten- 
ing of lints af latitude as one appmiches the poles from the 
equamr; as a resnlt it dkom the d distmccs btrwe~n 
importam points. For example, looking at his hisdhry Ma- 
captor map, the average citizen wonld say dut the shomst 
route from San Francisco to Yokohama would follow a straight 
line rnaning n o d  of Hawaii A d y ,  a ship azking the shm- 
est mu= would f* a " p t  circle*' c m m  carrying it dose 
to the Alcutign Wands jutting om- from Ahsh. The distance 
from SILa Frmcis#1 m Yokohama over this great circle route 
is ody 45jo miles, as oompared with 5,500 miles ovm the 
Ha& mutt. 
crhd "globular" map u d  on psgc 2 9  r more ammatt 
picture of rhe Pacific atea. It h the conperging masts of 
N o d  America and Asia which almost toin nt the Bering Strait 
to enclose tht northern half of the Fadie. It h &QWS the 
bmad sweep of great aeean at the epvator, broken onty by 
the ~~IJSWS of bny islands which dot the south-m sector. 
But what it brings out most skply is the dteaance which sep- 
rates the.chief uwitzme nations whose inwets lie m the 
PaciIic. 
The trcmcndons distaaccs of the Pacific have two smtqic 
c o ~ ~ ~ e s :  firs, thqr stnqdxn the power of defmc k 
relation to offme; w n d ,  they make outlying naval base 
mre impomt* This may be sew in anatyzillg the positian 
of the four great powers which face o m  mother ia tbe Pacific 
--the Ufiitd States, fapan, the Soviet Upicln and the Brit- 
ish C o m m o n d &  of Nations. 
1. THE UPElTED STATES IN THE PAUFPC 
By coombg sarategic barn in b own mrritories and posse 
siorrs, tfie Unired Statts can dominate the p a t  trian$e 
bomded by &Im, H a d  and The northere 
a p c h  sr, th Wnffern Hdspbcm is hiked by the Ah- 
ldan Tshds, whm the base at U&ks (Dutch Harbor) d d  
&ectiely block an advance The great f d e d  base at Hawaii 
d o h -  dw catire central Pacific and guards the principal 
Eosc-West arsde EUUIKS At P d  Harbor, Ha+ rhe U. S. 
maintains the most fannihblt naval owtpt in the world, 
t k c a e d b y M d s i r d e f a m s .  Atthesaudwmpainto the 
triangle the l%rmm Canal would be VUlaedEe 
P"
attack only if the U. S. flcet had bcen destroyad 
leave the Pacific, And tven thsn the vast &a of thc Pacific 
wodd mnain s se.riotls o W e  to my h q p x d e  amck 
Beyond thiP triangle, however, the ~~ of effective fleet 
action is hnbd by the lack of adquare mvd bases. The only 
U. S. basc west of P a l  Harbor is locabed at Mgaifa in the 
Philippines, where b t  asc &%ties for bsnw aaisers, m b  
~ t ~ d a n x i l i a r y c r a f t , h n t e o c b i i ~ p i t a l s h i p " ~  
PeaflHYborandMaailstheUnitwJ~hulds1.hreetiny 
b d s - W ,  W& ad 
~ysassrcpphgstontsonthe aL mute a0 the 
'1Errst. But Guam, the d y  one of these stepping stones which 
is d e  far a 6st- f d d  wual base, is sarmnndd 
by bun* of d smnallisl andsongiag t~ Japan. These olre 
tha Caroline, Marshall 4 Marks gmqm WW COT+ 
the Japanese Mudated Idands. 
Wlth the advent of & powera other islaad outposts in tht 

Pacific have become ptentidy important. Somh of Pearl Hw- 
bor the United Strrm and Great B&ah hoId a score of c d  
atolls dong rhc 2,3ao-de line to Samo8, M y  recmtly, s t v c d  
of these atoh have been occupied Three of t h e a t *  
Endexbury and Christmas Isfands-fly both the Anxrircan and 
British Aags. Thas air power is h d y  mending thre mns of 
M a n  naval supremacy in tbe southern Mc* 
2. JAPAN IN THE PACIFIC 
ff the Unitcd !hm holds a domiaant position ia the Pacific 
triangle, Japan, by virtue of htr own mval bases, holds a some- 
what simnar position in &e Western P d c .  The nmhcm 
approach to the Jspslntse maEdand is fbnked by the K d e  
h d s .  The approach from the ease is guarded by the h d n  
IdanaS, where Japan ~~ a s~condarp naval base, and by 
the ManW I h d s  mentioned above It is not known 
whether the GaroPinr~s and Mmldls have bcen fonifkd. Bar 
h any case, the many d n a n d  harbors fomd at TLI& 
Pogape and other islands in these p u p s  are suitable for use 
by planes, d d s  and d l  surface v-k The southem- 
m ~ s r  Japanme mandated h d  is only about 400 miles h m  
hvao, in rhe Philippines. From the south, the pxincipd nrari- 
time approach to Japan is guarded by r base at Fortma w k h  
d o h t c s  the CXina Sea and lies d y  350 miles eagt of H a g  
Kong. and h u t  700 miles n o d  of Manil& 
Dmhgthepasttwoywrs Japaahsssonghtto i m p m i t s  
spaaegic PQsitioa in tBe Far East by extaxkg iEs military 
o p t i o m  toward 50utheastwn A s k  The oecupdon of Hai- 
"n I s h d  h I939 gave Japan mother v d n l  kwc m the 
~ S e a T h e l i m i # d ~ o f M ~ i n ~ ~  
seemed to p e  the way m d  s d w d  movement 
~ a g a i n s t * r i c h p r i Z G d f b & N c t h ~ d s X n d i e s .  
S h d d J a p a n e m b l i s h a b a s e a t C a n v a n h B Q Y i n I n d ~  
she would k Onty 780 d m  h m  % q p ~  
3. THE BRITISH WIRE IN THE PAclFle 
The British Empire ha long Md an impomt stah in the 
P@c, with its and c o w &  interest and its emdying 
Pa&e khuds and its three great DominiontiAusdia, New 
Zedand and Cam& But d e  the United Stam and Japan, 
Britain holds no cornpacr, d p  defended base of operorriDas in 
t h e W c . I t s ~ ~ n s a r e w i d e l y ~ a n d i t s g a d e  
mute3 are exposed at vial points. 
For many ycgls Great Brit.ain protected its ' 'w h the 
.Iposra Pacific by an d€imce with Japan. When this ce wras ter- 
minated after the Washingran Werencle in 1922, the British 
developed a new fortified base at Sinppore. At the tip af tbe 
Malay Peninsula, S i n g a p  occupies a txmmim- pirim 
onrhemd~mresbcmmnIndia,theFatEastandAnstFalia. 
Ah+hsfleetWst.Singaporewouldbcinastrongposi- 
tiontodefendEhellarrowwatersof EheBrithhanddmNcther- 
laads Eaa India, 
I n ~ ~ ~ c r , s d b C p T i e c i p d m i i t s d t h e B r i r i s h N s v y  
ware -41 rhe A h t i c  and the Meidit- British 
mvd farces in the Far Esst wcre limiEBd to s fiw cr9istrs, 
sub&= aad light surf8ee v& Tha: once powerful 
British base at Hong Kaq--iwme r45o d e g  northcast of 
Sipre-k. today an isolated O U ~  heady f d b i l ,  
but cut off from the mainJgnd by japa~bse d c s  in Soathem 
Qlina Several strategic bascs have been developed in A d a  
and New haland, but these, too, are isolated and remote from 
the mPin theater in the In&=. Qtwest n, the v M   are^ .of the 
East lndies is Port Darwin in northem A w d b ,  2,000 d c s  
from Singapore. h is Ipq5siblq howwer. d*lt the Dntrch Gsses 
of Smbays and Amboina, in the Nd-dls EaBt India, may 
help rn bdsw Brih's power in this region. For dney are still 
mntxofltd by Britain's OUyv the N~~ pvtmmmt-in- 
de, to whirh the Dutch d e e s  are ~ppacmdy temaining 
lo* 
4 WE SQVlB WION IN THE PACIFIC 
ThefoUrthGmtP~wErhadc inthePac i f i cbsPin-  
t h e S D v i e t U b h ~ a b n g w h e ~ f r o g l t h e  
~ S t r a i t m i t s ~ ~ ~ ~ t h a n b a s r : a t W ~ k , l e s s t h a a  xpao 
milts f m  Tokya Rusk kecps s flecr of sub&= in Far 
E a s t e r n w ~ t t r s a u d ~ a s a o m p ; d t s r y l a n d a i F b a s e ~ t  
W m k .  Hawevery it is not a Ecading: mnuritime ~lgtion and 
h n o ~ ~ 0 e e t H w o e , f o r t h c y 1 t l e a s t , t h c S o v i c t  
Unionis n o t ~ a s o m p j o r f a c t w  on thesea. 
STRAIEGK: cok4auSIONs 
Mibuy and naval awth* drpw s e v d  ~~~,clusio~ls h m
these facts. In general, they pgrac with Major George Fielding 
~otdwn%ufoaghtacxlwsthebmadthofso vastan ocean 
is hrsngk wi& pery great diilidtics.'' me Unld Stares, 
)roldiq the stmngm position borh d-y and d&ndvelyy 
can Wcn$c J a p ' g  mnml of the westena Pacific ody if she 
has aceess to strongly f d e d  bases in Far East, Japan, an 
the d e r  hd, caneat effectively challenge the United Snrtes 
0 t t h r e a ~ ~ p o s i d O n i n t h e ~ H a ~ P a n a m a ~ t  
u n l e s s t b t ~ ~ ~ ~ . f l ~ b a s b c e n f o P c o d m ~ w h m t Z l e  
As long as Britain's Navy is cngPged in the A h t i c  
d the Meditermcan, her position et S i m  and m the 
Esst Indies, withwt the suppart of the Uniabd Seam remths 
e a c p a s a d . R ~ i s a f s c t o r a m l g ~ f a r a s h e r a i r f o r c e s h  
EastAsiamightengage J ~ a r a t i m e ~ ~ t h e  Japmxewere 
atwarwkhthtWemmpwem 
The ammge cisiztn may well be puzzled. Logically, thrsc 
straPegic~r~drEvehimtcrrrPardoaeoftwoo~tepli& 
cal txmdusi~lff He may mdode tht Unioed Weg bols 
n o t h i n g m ~ ( p n d ~ m l a s t ) f r o m ~ i r n & e F ~  
~ m d b e ~ ~ c 1 o o l d r a k 4 a d e f ~ s t i a a d b W i c s W c  
~ I t ~ 1 1 t i I t h e o o ~ i a t h e A t l a n t i c i s d e e ~ I n ~ t  
case, Jaw would have a free hand to extend her conml aver 
southastern Asiaandtfierichprh of theEast India Or, if 
hc belinncs crur vital interem would be ~ t e n c d  by further 
Japanese e q m i o n ,  he may conclude tkt it is Immx to adopt 
a ~ p d c y n o w ~ c ~ t h a n s t i l n d i d l y b y . I n ~  case, how- 
ever, Be must recognize d m  the ~~ ~~t fsr a 
positbe policy is an apement  with Great Britain md the 
N & M  govm-t-in-txile grrntitrg f i e  United States 
full acms to British and Dutch bases in sonthemem Asia. Aad 
he must consider whether the United States, even -with rmch 
ak&isscrongaroughtonmthexisEtofwrrrinthe~caad 
intheAtlanticaconeauddwsmctim~. 
l k f ~ f ~ h e c a a @ ~ d a ~ a a d d y i n ~ e c l t ~ t t o  
2 h e s c p l l t i e a I q u ~ ~ m , t h t c i ~ m u s t e x a m i r r e E h e  
presffu: statarr of oru aqnd forces. 
IH. Bluepdnt for Our New A m d  Forces 
Taking stmk of the d t q  dcfcnses of thc United States at 
tho end of IW, tbE American people found their armed forces 
i n ~ o n f r a m a p e a c t t o a w a r f ~ g . T h e G e r m D n & I v e  
to the Cbanuel ports in May iand dht m h p  of Frame in June 
had shamred America's ampIacmcy and undermined her tra- 
ditional sttlse of security. In the face of m- dangers, 
the nation ernbarked on what ddestined to btcomt the 
p t w e  rtarmamezlt drive in its entice history, 
In this brief book there is not spec enongh m dcscribc the 
defense program in detail, Bnt hem 3s a slsmnary of the amse 
important defense measures which bave been pat through 
1. APPROPRWflONS 
In IW Congress authorizbd i q e d h m  of $rq,bgz,st7,p~o 
far m i b y ,  naval and air d e f e .  Ont of this sum it sllcmtcd 
funds to be p t  aad cao- to be la in ~wr ~ms follow: 
Early in IWI, President R m E t  submitted to Congress r 
bndget for 1 ~ 2  d b g  for the c x p c n ~  of an additid 
f 1 4 8 ~  1 314.,boo for nadonal dcf~nsc, This wodd rake- d e f a ~  
aosa over the thmpcar ptriod f 9 4 0 r ) Z  bO more than fa&-- 
~ n o t i n d ~ t h e ~ a f a i d r o ~ T h c c h a r r  
o* jnllsmm what dme ourlays mcart m the average 
dtka 
2 ARMY AN0 NAW PERX)NNEL 
Im ~pqo Congress orlso adapted the Selective %mke and Train- 
ingAcl;fsq&gallmenheenrr ad3storegistctfor 
&"'p scdcc. Thc Act pro* o m  y t d s  d v e  training 
f~rnotmortthaagoo,000men~tryonetiasohdmeof 
. . peace, or rmlimlted service in tinme of war, As the Act wlas to 
remain in force for marly f i e  pars, the rnen tmhed under 
its provislom might e v d y  a d  OW epoo,am. 
1 6 0 n g r e s s ~ & ~ & M d e n t t o ~ t h e  
NatidGtlarrdhmontyePr"s~swvirCcintbeWamrn 
H ~ ~ o r t h e U n i a t d S t a t e s ~ o g 4 s n d t o ~ r r p  
r m m e ~ k Q f t h i C A m y d N r i v y . C o  Wpa- 
t i o n s o n r h e c n I i s t a d ~ o f d . l e R ~ A F a y , w h i c h h a d  
btnn Exed at 3374x10 meq were likewise rmovtd, Aria the 
N a d d  Gwrd stmlgth was raised from 2lqxm ou, 318~000 
men In January Igqr, rhc Pnsickt aush- Hmashg the 
mlistodstrengchoftheNavpm t ~ z ~ , P f t t s ~ h a d  
already misex? it fmxn rq5porr to I-. 
3. ARMY AND NAW EQUIPMENT 
In the summer of rgqo C o n p  sanhond a "v" 
navy, and by the end of zhe year the g o v ~ n t ' s  shipbuild- 
ing program d e d  for the comtmction of 3&0 new naval ves- 
sels in five to seven ytars. Otfier measures provided for 35,000 
military B i r p h t s - z ~ p m  for the ArmyI r o w  for tht Nav- 
and alsa for &g " m t i a l  item" ( n o d y  produced 
wmmercjdly) to equip an of ~+o,ooo men. In addition, 
Goypsi made provision for bnildhg up reserve stocks of 

There was d a wide gap bawear plans and ped'~ 
T o  +ah the msons for delay* to understand the+ new objec- 
t i ~ e s a a d t o m o a s n r e t b e p ~ a c b i e v l e d , w e r m a s t ~ e  
d~e: milit%rp d naval ~~ more closelyv F i  we 
shallhknt&eNavyy thea &Armyt andhdlytheargani- 
atim for mobilizing the vast i n d d  rcsoancm of the 
ccuatry. 
N. The Navy , 
Thc Navy began its atpamion p r o p  with a considerable 
head sran over the Army. As we haoe seen, one of President 
Roosevelt's h t  acts after his inauguration in r933 was to begiq 
&e bniIding- up of the fleet. At that tjIlae he ~ ~ I C I C B ~  $238,- 
00~- of public worb funds to start ooasg91ction of some 
32  nwp n a d  vmek 
Thcn in 1934 Congress passed the V ! i - T d  Aa. 
This law called for sbs cmstmction of roz d & o d  corn- 
batant ship w bxhg the fleet up to the 5-5-3 ratio of the Wash- 
h p n  snd h d w  N o d  Tmtia In 19384ter the emties 
had tqhed- a ~ o ~  sumha to per cent incrme 
iathe~under-agem~geoftheNavy(thatis ,cruisers 
1- than ro years old, d-ym lcss thPR 16, etc.). Originally 
planaed as a mi-year~prognrm, thic.1938 expamian bill author- 
ized a cwnpledy modem flaet 00&g 1~557,ma 
Bythebegbhgof rw whmthepgmmwas well under 
way, shipyards which bad bcm idle during dae 'twenties were 
again humming with d y .  W i i  s &st& flee$ in com- 
d&oe andm less tbnn 82 new sktipontht ways, the Sec- 
ntary of the Navy was b l e  to say in his a n n d  report for 
1g40 that tfac "Ame&m p p l e  may feel M y  c d e n t  in 
their Navy.n 
Upuntil J u n a a f t h e s a r a e y e a r t h t r e ~ m b e g o o d  
reason for this &cial d d m c e .  For the first time since the 
Wahinlgcon Conference in 1922, the Unitad States had, in 
fact, a navy "'second to none." The "fleet ia beiag" was power- 
fu5 well-uaiaed and &chr. It was at least & equal of the 
great British Norvy d was ddmkely superior to thc J a p c s c  
f l e a  The gEtual tonnage rado in the P a d c  was about 5 for 
the United States to 34 for Japan And the American Naqy 
was monger &an thc combined navies of the two 
Axis p o w t ~ w  and Iraly. 
The core of the American flea was irs forcx of rg capid 
ships built between r9rz and 1923. ro of these big ships had 
been modemizRd and 8 new bdeships were on the ways. 
Supported by 6 aircraft carriers, 35 cruisers, 197 destroyers 
and r o ~  subimrhcs, the United States Navy wss sappod to 
be ready for action at a moment's notice. To the admirals, as 
wdtl as to the avtmge citizen, there seemed to be good mason 
for confidence in the ability of the fleet to meet almost my 
emergeacy which might atist. 
WHAT THE 0 N E - m  NAVY COULD DO 
But rhe Navy of 1~ was a ''one+manq' Navy d h =PC- 
icy did not include the a b ' i  to combat a combination of 
en- powcrs operadng in two meam at rhe samt rime. Navd 
expcra ap-g before the oouunhecs of Congress in the 
winter and e d y  spring of r g 4 o  brought out somt af The things 
which the onedcean mvy d d  and a d d  not be expected to 
do. Bridp, hem we the opiniw e q r e s d  by "ponsib1t naval 
authoridles: 
I. With a fleet of 1,557,000 tons of modern der-age ves- 
sels (as authorized in the 1938 program) &c Navy was con- 
fident of is ability to d d d  the 'W vimets" of the United 
States against "my single foreign power." 
2. The Navy was " m l y  co&dwt'' of irs abiliy to 
defend o m  home waters, the approaches to the IPaaama Curd, 
TRENDS IN US* DEFENSE SPENDING 
EACH COIN - ONE BlU l  ON DOLIARS 
the vital Caribbean and Hawaiian sectors against any combina- 
tion of hostile powers which did not include the British fleet. 
3. In the Pacific the 5 :  5:3 ratio was regarded as "adequate" 
to defend the Alaska-Hawaii-Panama triangle bu't not adequate 
to defend the Philippines, or to give the United States naval 
dominance in Far Eastern waters. To assure naval dominance 
over Japan in the Western Pacific, it would be necessary to 
build an impregnable naval base in the Philippines, fortify 
Guam, secure access to other bases (such as Singapore) in 
Sourheast Asia and to increase further the strength of the 
United States fleet in the Pacific. Some exp& believed we 
should need a ratio of t to I-others said 3 to I-over Japan. 
q, In tbe Atlantic the oneioceap: Navy "could give a fdr 
account of iaclFt in defending our'vid ~~ and uphold- 
ing the Monroe Doctrine apima a* by my combinatim 
of Earopean powers, prdded the British Navy had not fden 
into the haads of the many, end pfoviaed we were-not 
~ i n n a v a l 0 ~ 0 1 l s i n t b R P ~  
5. The one-ocean Navy wodd not be adequate to defiesld 
oar horn -ten a d  o w  outlying pasedons, m uphold the 
M o m  Doctrhre and defend oat trade mates againsr a h d e  
combination operaFing s - m d y  in both the A h t i c  and 
t h e ~ 0 ~  
TOMEETANEWCHALbENGE 
The possibility of far-reaching c h q c s  iu the intematiod 
simtion Id the Navy Dprment as early as January IW, 
t o r t v i s e I t s ~ c P a ' a n e a P s d n a v P l n c e d s ~ S t a r k ,  
&Cbi&ofNaPal~~puthiscasewCongressinthese 
muds 
T ? m t w e ~ d d a d d ~ t o b  theUnitedStatefleet 
up to not 1- than that r e p i d  ao ?f &end thc U n i d  States, 
its interests and passcssiozas; and maintain the integrity af the 
Monroe Doctrine agaiost the combined navies of o w  potendaI 
enemies in borh ooeans. That would, in give us a fleet 
big enough to meet threats in borh oceans. Thmmdcdyl 
again to insare victory we should be srz 'or to the combined 
of our pormtinl enemies BnRho~l4 for -p*q 
b e  a 5 : ~  snperi06ty available in the Pa&c and 4:3 mpe- 
rioritp for the Atlank'' 
But in January rggo the threat still seemed remote and 
'%80retIca Admiral Stark asked for only a 'hod-'' maease 
of zy per cmt, d Cmgress drought cven this too high. Ir 
a r p d  tfist the Navy hadn't yet begrm to Iay down dl of 
the ships s a t h d  in thc 1938 program, and cut dawn the 
s n g p t d  to r r per cent. May 15-6vt days tfter 
t h e ~ a z i ~ k ' & i e ~ ~ ~ ~ d b e g l ~ ~ ~ r a n c e r n d t h c  
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Informadon on tht building pr-ms oE Eorcign powem has not bEm 
made public dm? September lagg. 
Low Countries-the Senate Naval Affair5 ComSnim q m t e d  
that it did "not believe it n~cssary to inereax the building 
aurhoriza6.on program at this h e . "  kcmially, the r I pex cent 
increase was W y  voted on June 14-three days before the 
surrender of France. A month Iater Con- v d  rhc twu- 
ocean N q ,  and m July 19 Pddent RoasePaIt approvtd 
the largest mwl program ever m d d ~  by my nation. 
THE wo-ocE&N NAVY BlU 
This is what the two-mem navy bill propad: 
r, T o  increase the authorized men@ m aederdge cornbet 
v d  by 1,3z5,cm to- 70 per ant haease over 
atxthorizations which would h u t  qd the size of the fleet 
then in tmmmbio~ 
2. To pmvide aa additbd rm+am mm of amdiary ves= 
sels and as many d craft (motor torpedo boats, pm1 
boars, m.) as may be e v .  
3, To increase the aambuc of W txhma£t9% 15- 
t e n ~ t h e e x i s r i n g ~ - - ~ r a s ~ y m o r e a s r h e ~ -  
d m  deems eeces%ary. 
+ To authorize appnypriadons of f sp,owymo for expansion 
of shipping ficilities, cmhnwt plants, atmor p h t  famries 
and so forth 
The dxmted cat  of the building p q p m  alone-not 
mmhg tht exflaesian of sbippds d p h  c a ~ t y - w ~  
@wed c o ~ v e l y  at &orojoa,,mu, with BD added tz,Sw,- 
DW,OOO for campletion of vessels already under amamcdoa 
The following table shows how much the t.cipoocene Navy 
program sdded to the programs oattSned in thc earlier qim- 
&on bills: 
But no amount of money can buy baotlmhips in a day. Wha 
the n e c e s q  h d s  had been voted, the new ships mth& 
and the oont~gcts Ict, what &e average c i h  wanted to how 
wss how fase tbt twtxman Navy wdd be built. The answer 
@en by mval amhozkh was -not encomBisgII n n o d  
times it has taken us over font years eo build o battieship 
three years or mre to build and equip alight cruises or an 
airctaft&er;andarIasttwoyears to completer fllb-t 
or d m y t r ~  Fprthermore, ow shipbuilding fadt ics  are lim- 
ited. TI& meam thPt; at the very earliest, the United h w s  
oodd not hope to place its two-wan Navy in c o ~ o n  
before 1996. 
NAVAL PROGRESS REPOETS 
Nevertheless, m r p g r  the "fim in iabeing" was expanding 
rapidly. N a d y ,  the Navy m ' t  d i n g  the world just 
how fast it bopel t~ put new ships In 6% But two 
new 35,txmtan bard* were hunched in 1gq0 and 
scheduled to job the fleet in xpqr. By the end of rggz 
a great many more new shi E d  down under thc 1938 and 
1940 7 wiU be m$ m join the fleet. This should 
give the United Staas a navy of at least 17 capital s h i ~  
and r aota serengtfi in all categories of w d  over r,fioo,om 
tons, 
There m other s i p  of immediate expansion. The 
m k e d  pmmd of the Navy had increased from 145,000 
men in June t~ about igopoo at the end of the year* A f d e r  
haease of e,imo men was projected in January rg91.  N o  
less than 138 ships were a d l y  under consrruction, while 
191 more had been orderad and appro@md for. The Navy's 
shore mduns and bases WXE being rapidly enlargsd. Seventy- 
five thwsand men were at wark in the shipywds-qgpc~, in 
govmment and 30,mo in private yards. Between qn and 
50 ~ ~ n m d  ~ l + f ~  cargo ships, tankem and pwssen- 
gtr &had bcen p- fur naval a- mxs. Some 
15- gseanbiers of the Naval RCSM~ had btax called up 
fotsctmedrrrytamanthesenewa~shipsortoscrv~ 
THE NAVAL LINEUP IF GERMANY WINS 
T o d a y , ~ t n o s t v i t a l ~ m o f ~ ~ f i a e t i S d c d t o  
be control of marlthe m dons and dre conduct of 
optrations ss fw as pixsib1t from oar shorn This is ~~y 
Mahan's d&e that *defense is assured only by o f f u ~ ~ ~ ' '  
Like Mahan, p c t b d y  all m d  mqkm today reject 
the id= of amit def- ar s “cod frontier" beyond which 
the dtet would nut a a e q t  to ~ O E .  The Unittd %us 
Navy has becn dmipcd for 1 q - w  traas-ocean o p  
atioap, and nat for defuse of a mid- Maghot Line. This 
is why wc have b d t  ships of tho p p e a  @1t d i n g  
=a=w 
W e  have seem, howevert that even the longat-range fleet 
r s a n n o t ~ ~ t l t n a p a l b n t f n e l s a d ~ ~ n s .  
2 ~ ~ ~ d i a s o f s c t i 0 ~ 1 i s 9 1 3 0 u t 3 ~ ~ p n d i t s d & ~ i s  
restricted m opemiom coaducxed more &HI 2- mites from 
i a r b e s e s . T h ~ g t ~ c f n c b o f f a n d t h e ~ e l ~ 0  
w b i c h w z d i n o u r f m t i n v e ~ t o  nmscbekeptinmind 
in cotrsidcriq the pmdbIe tnkdom o the UnM !hm Navy 
in the Atlantic d the Mc. 
7 
NEW -lES 
Atthcheghhgof x i p + ~ , t u m w c r ~ t h e N q W t h e ~  
sibility af dmgdm new asdgments. It wss cmpIIcd eo 
w~.r#lcasttwocombingcades: ( I )  a s h w k m h w W h  
~ f f e c t ~ b e d w t r o y e d o r f ~ b t h e h & o f  Gcr- 
maay Mom we d d  give cffaaivr: aid 4nd before we could 
coqpkt-e oru twwxem N B ~ ,  and (2) r sitasti011 in which the 
Wnibed States might undertake to support British ses power in 
odt r  tu prevent its complete dewrncrioa 
I n t h e k t  ' 4 d o n  or caprue of the British 
&ct-the Na-be roqoLDd m ~~ d its 
smmgthatthemoscvi&l~inonrdcfinsechain-&Pan- 
amp~thE~bem,mdHawai i .Bycontrolofdmnew 
b ~ f r o m ~ w ~ c O a l d d o l l b d f f s d d g l d t h e  
m oder ~8paiti.c~. Sites had h e n  Sateted for the eight 
new n a d  bssts accypired from G m  Bricaimq aldr011gh the 
actual wark of C-Q wes just 
w- 
A px'p-fy audit of the Navp"s 
r, r ~ s h o w e d ~ ~ ~ d p ~ f l e e t s a s f d o w s :  
f3Mp Buildlag or 
US"Tkec Abi$? US. Navy 
itlBCing' mj' a, 1941 h1011 
Thefacrwhiehimpresmthe average c i ~ m o s t ~ y  
h this audit is the t h e  rcquirad zo build a =nd mvy. Tbc 
k f m ,  a t : ~ f ~  forthe neztfewyears,islikelyto be our 
chief concam It will affect dl' of m milirary txtcda* not 
~lywithr;especrmtfieNsqybattheentireaasiwaldefense 
Pro- 
THE W S  JQB TODAY 
mt~qaePtioPwHichtfisciaizcn&kWlhgtarcth+pmb- 
ab1tmkimofthef l id  ~ i s r r o ~ ~ o ~ ~ r r s r a n r a t a n p  
t i m e . h i s ~ ~ p ~ t i n t l m s o f ~ . w 8 t ; n ~ s t r a -  
E e g i c P n d p o l i t i c d ~ m a p ~ o ~ g h t . T h c N a ~ y  
, d o e s n a t ~ f ~ p a l i c j r , i t i e a s a n ~ f f o ~  
~g i to ta .What$reNovymapbe~ i td f~def tndarPd  
wherthmnyberoqrmitsamopcra#,dlda~c,dtpcndnpon 
t h e f o ~ p o I i c y o f t h s ~ n n d a l s o u p m t b e ~ ~  
of other powers. For the mims of other powers m y  deter- 
mine~wecenresno inntpe~ceorwherewempvbc  
~ @ d ~ f i s h ~  
approaches ta onr &ores. But beyond t h ~ s e  d c t c d  arras 
our field of naval d t l  weald be limited. 
L o h e s e c o n d c s s e , ~ c M a ~ ~ ' ~ t b c c a l I e d n p o n t n  join 
in supporting that p a t  ring of f o ~ i b ~ ,  Cape- 
town, Suez, Singapre and the Ansh.alian &which have ' 
enabled BriEain m mnml the seas. ln rhe Adantic, United 
States farem might be reqaired for n a d  corny dmy to pro- 
tea the vital d m  highway to Briitain, or to defend key 
pomlifCeDa1rarmthe~dAfriaBnt:asloagsBritain 
conmfled the Atlantic, the Unid Ststes wold be free to 
b m  its main battle fleet in thc P d c .  Wihout impregnable 
h o f  iitsownin&eFarEh,it~~t,theUniadStaoe~ 
could not carry on single-handed o ~ t i ~  in & Wmtem 
M Bat with arxegi to Singapore d BritEsh bsses in 
Australh, olnd . p ~  it wns not serie~dy tagsged in the 
Ahtic ,  the United States fl#t d d  become 0 form ta be 
reckoned with in Far &sum mtm. 
we shall cotnt back to these p055iblr: ~ ~ l l * c i e s  when 
we consider the midon of thc armed forces in relation to 
national policy.. But nowwe tarn to the &my pmpm 
V, The Army 
Unlike the Navy, the lmd foms of the U d d  S ~ t e  have 
never been oTg&lljZbd ifl peacehe for l s u p a d c  olperadoas 
at a moment's notice. Throughout our peaceeirnc history, 
beking at our a a d  ocesn would sllow us l s e  
w r a i s e a m o l s s e r m y f o r a n y ~ I w e h a v e r e l i e d a n  
a d volunteer regdm army hacked by a ci&nf's m d i h  
But when President Rawmelt signed tfre SeIecdve MCC 
and Training Act on S e p t d m  16, I*, tbe W n i d  %tes 
Army had heady taken the initial step in a p q m m  af 
itxpmion which had beensin the making over a pariad of 
~ y y ~ F e w c m i l i o a s ~ t h D t t h c b a s i E ~ h n d ~  
U down twenty yeam Mom, jost afccr the Fksr Wodd 
War, wbcn Congtess dopttd the N r t i d  Defense Act of 
1920. Tk o r @ d  p m p  had not anti a SEmdatl 
'dylikethatwhiebfncedAmcricainr~~bu~itptoPided 
thc onlr errisriag fmmwd on which to b d d  a mass army* 
ZHEUSARMYBTWEENWARS 
3% d m d  the comp"id0n of the new m y ,  snd tht @- 
lum of expmbn, it is necessary to lwk k k  for a moment 
tO d h  WC dhWy PrOgram of X930, L h  l@&~n, 
th National Defense Act was a compromise Getween two 
apiposing theorieg. One held that the defense n& of 
d t e U n i t o d S t a ~ e s c o P J l d ~ b e p r e t b y a ~ ~ t o r h t % a -  
dhionaln American pliq of a tmhd mWa; the othm &wry 
a d w d  a WelIorpked pdessiod m y ,  capab1e of 
expansion ia h e  of war by indnction of traiaed riwmts, 
~ i t s ~ ~ ~ ~ t h c w a i r d W a ~ , t h e A P m y ~ c o n -  
Pincad of the need for amp- mibay smvice, md m- 
mended a pamama4 professid force of morc dYaa p , o m  
~ ~ r m d b y n ~ e a f ~ ~ z e n w h o h s d ~ i v e d  militury 
mining. Ba Congress ~ ~ s s  r m ~  to adopt codption in 
time of peace, and finally appruved a c o m p h  oqpkation, 
r h d d y  capable of beiq eqmdaI in an merpyI bat 
based e d d y  on vaImmq edkmmc 
T h e v - s e t u Q M d e r t h e r N M  
D e f a r s e A c t d e d o f h ~  
2. The Reguhr Amy, camposod of pfespional soap 
0- in 9 itrfantry * nnd z CBI* divi- 
~ w h 0 9 ~ ~ d ~ ~ t o ~ o u d y i n g  
oonduet civilhm nainieg d m e  (with the 
Nr30aral Guard) as a protectm la of king *cf'-z *Y e x p a n d Q d ~ = & = w = Y -  s- 
s t r e D g c h w a s ~ a t 2 ~ ~ m e n .  
# 2 .  Th N- Qswrd, mnpmd o f ' c i h n  lmllolr#aps 
S t a m ~ o n d a b a ~  
* ~ ~ o r t F P i ~ ~ t 8 c s i z c o f t b e ~ A F m g .  
3. The &g&d & J ~ s ,  oormpostd (in theory) of aolined 
o%cers and men l%ldm.de as a reservoit ai 
the Regular Amy and Natiod Guard in 
~ b ~ d o n .  
Ir TbaDrerethctbrr+~a~prMDldwhLhnmu.rmyro 
w b e ~ i n ~ o f w a r . B n t d ~ r h e ~ m m d a a a d ~  
W t h i r t i e s , w h e n ~ ~ ~ d r r m ~ o b e ~ i l i e y , & f ~ a p p m  
priathswerecutand t h c ~ ~ d  t o a s k e l ~ f ~  
BetwaeP 1927 and 1935 the R q p k  Army kept r a 
saength of I 18,750 cd&d men; the National Grrard at abeac 
rpm. And without compdsq mihay P'aining, he War 
lkpmmmt was rmab1c w cmte a reserp.e force wid& would 
have begl&lemfolfil. itsrolein t h e m o b ~ t i o n s c b ~  As 
a ~ t . l t h e o r l g i n a l p h f o r ~ g a ~ a r m y w s s d ~  
and emphasis was placd on a irtnan, highly trained mobile form 
to be ready for action on short notice. This force, bmm as 
the "initial proteabe f-" was to be made up of 'anios of 
the RegB1OV Atmy md Nat id  Gvard totaling ahout 
officersandmen.Then,afcarGonpsELodpsssed~~il 
Icgkhtion, the tamps weald be reinfo& by s 'jprotectmt 
mobiliation farce'' of bout r ~ , o o o  rnm. 
m s , i n b r i e f , w s s t b c p ~ * t h e w a r D ~  
had btgun 00 carry out as early as thR Summer of 193% 
w h e n w o u i n E ~ s c c m a d ~ t n t I n h ~ t h c  
&mxy of Hemisphere d.efeasc, which had gained f a m  oz 8 
&ne wheg dre Ameriam pp1e  looked w i  mthrt 
idea of a great - q a a n a r p  foroc, A F T  
had been a t l t h d  m increase its nambGts from r6~poo ~o 
t xopoo (July 1939). With tkb ontbtea% of war in IEnmpa, fur- 
m y  tsd3- the mqtii of tht Rcgulpr Army at 375Jooo 
t h e r h m ~ n a h M b y h R o i d c m d n d ~ a n g  rrJq 1 
a n d t h a t O f t h e N ~ G u a t d a a z j 5 ~ ~ m f f l . %  
was tu bt the mclcus for im orderly, p r o p s h e  qmmion 
of the land forces of thc United Seates. 
WE BLITZKRIEG ALTERS OUR PUNS 
Itnt the Army was never to have o chance to carry out its 
ordtrly, p m p d v e  program When the Bhkrieg muck in- 
May and June, the Amricm popIt looked with ~ 0 0 .  
at dreiF litdt R e p b r  Army and N a U  Guard, and d a d  for 
~ t o m a t c h ~ h ~ p N ~ ~ , f R i X h i t s m o c ~  
legions, which was sweeping acms ~ P R '  Six months 
l ~ , t h e U ~ ~ A E m J r h a d b e e n g i v m S 8 , ~ m  
spend as hit as it codd Its o w  plaashd been swept away, 
Its early dw boosted b old, d its "initial p m x i v e  
force'' merged in the Inrgu: mob&& plaa By Janusry 
1%" &e thC& g a l  was the creation of an m y  of 
r + p , a m a n i n d ~ a n a i r f ~ o f  r8~lni l i tarpplaaw,  
a d  equipment for even h p r  forces which mi@ be required 
inthefuture. 
T h e c h P r t o p p o e r l a a a d ~ E a b k o o n ~ ~ t ~ a I m o s t a S  
mruch~~gllbe.Eo2dnbrPlltthe~s~agcoftheAtmy'sgcpaa- 
s i o n p r o g r a s n , l a ~ f u r m , t h c p ~ d r c s t o t l f % o f o n r  
~ f o m s w M a y 3 o , r p r y o , w h s n t h e p r a g r u n b e p  
i n c a r o e s t , a a d d l e ~ e c k i e v e a b y t h t d o f t h e ~ ~  
T h e ~ s b o w n ~ W d y o n ~ ~ r c p o r n d  
c b q m s i d  Co ~ q m r t s o r p r e ~ ~ d ~ i s p a c d b y  
the War Dcfmment and ~temcnps issaed by the NadonaI 
Defense AdPisogt Chmnkioa Nattdly, they c o d  no 
d d d  i n f o d o n  ad icocal no mibuy seatm But 
~ h e l p m ~ c r s c r r s t o f $ t e m ~ n p ~ ~ h p r t  
b c i n g W b y ~ o n s o f ~ c i t i z e n s .  
T H E  U.S. ARMY IN TRANSITION 
h!i IT w # A  a 
rulrrqw 
SPECIAL UWltS 
EQLlWMZWT ON HAND EQWIPMlDTT ON ORDER, 
M Y  ilo. sgqo9 JANUARY 1, xgpr 
(including B r i U  Pnd Wgn 
matdid omicm) 
A i m f t  
a m  plane of all tpa 
AlrosfJ 
Tt P%%f?8%te1g 
EdlduEal for Army, 7poo for 
Naq 
Pisid Artillcry Fwd A d *  
gum and how- 17- k v y  gums and Wlsaa ZZ'gg! d I s) n6- u&hl 
r ~ ~ q p A ' z m m m  * s m ( r r n ~ m m m  
Anti-Airmft p H  
46f aad-ouaaft guad 
1,04 antisifcmft msdhe @ns at num- 
I*t# Ymdhe ganrr 60P early de- 
Hmy, sm- nmbrr 
a n m b  
S d  rr*nrr smut3 4wm 
spwm old dtta t m n c l p *  
flm rantsut0madF riib automatic d&r 
as8 md-mak ~ p m  ~fiaaad-taak gma tor  
Q maam gum early dcfipcrg, u d b  
d a d  nunaim cw or- 
da 
~ p a o  - grnm 
bordsd 
CoRaI#t Ptziakks Combat saMGtcs 
#io old W 
9 rrgts-ugl m.kB pem mwh 
~ ~ t d ~ g t e a r r r  I- smut aad OD- cm Sor 
lmmodiaLC deilarg, uu- 
 numbera an^ 
- I n * w t l m ~ U l l b c a , C h s A r m r f b m l ~ ~ o f d d b o t r M 1  
~ . r t m 4 p r a d ~ m n r ,  
ON THE DEBIT SIDE 
Thechartandthctab~cgIvc~cindhdmoftfrernagnhde 
oftheprojsnedprokam.Thyshow how thc War Depart- 
m m t m a d e u a e o f i t P ~ p ~ w o r k e d o e t ~ ~  
y tous ,andhowthRWtpbwerechaggcrd~d~edby  
t h t s w i f t ~ o f e v e n t s ~ d T h e y ~ ~ u s s h o r t -  
mmin~smdso~s~od&t&~layswhichmelnrtnoe~- 
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~ a n d ~ l e o ~ Q f l r h a g o v ~ s E i t r s e . F a r  
wha the draft aa was pmd m & p m k  rWo, 
i t w z s a p e c d t h n t a g o o d p a r r d t h e k  
tra inetgwotr ldbcmd~ttarI~inrpgr;yaibydm 
b e r d y ~ ~ z o p o o m w ~ ~ s e n r t o c s m p . ~ d t l a p  
in the having p q m m  was respadie. But with adeqtmts 
hous ingpr~v idd , thehys t iMfacedthe~trgpkOf  
nainiag some &04000 raw recruits during 1941. To ekfi~r out 
this task, the Regular Army snd N a t i d  Guard Mtma 
wme Elied out by recruits for insmudon. Mose MWDS had 
at least 50 per ceat of trainees, and some had as high ns 
7 5 p c r c e n t . A s a d 4 t h e R e g t & i r ~ ~ ~ a s l & w i t h  
~ y n o u n i t s o f ~ n e d ~ . o o p s a v ~ l e a t o n a *  
any em-, Some military experts g l d y  predictsd tbat 
i t d d e a k e t w o y e a r s m ~ a n d ~ p t b e n e w f o r e e o f  
r,p,ooo mm t h ~ ~ y ~  
The~andtfie~eomitothershortcamings,stlchns 
the Iag in prdrauctioa (raentloned Ister) and & brrld 
i n t h c ~ d ~ p i f o t s . ~ 1 p 4 0 p ~ g r 0 m ~ y  
called for tht prosnrement of z w  p30m ie two p.cars, bat 
thiswasqukIrlylraisedto 7,moaadthen rzmpilots inme 
year. This program was hgghg. Dut.jng. I341 the avih 
Ammutics Baud will give pinmy mining to about 45- 
student pilots, and secondapr or specialized orrining to 30,wm 
~ j ~ n a t e s o f t h e s c c i ~ c o ~ w i l l g o i n t o t b e A n v y  
s c W  for adtmced d n b g ,  bnt tho resolts of this ma- 
prise have ya to be demanmatbd. 
ON 'THE CREDIT SIDE 
On h e  d t  side, hmeoer, the c i b  hds m n m d m  
d m e e ~ . T B e n ~ o f ~ d i v i P i o n s W d o o b 1 d b y  
t h c d o f t p g c l i a n d t h w m b e r o f ~ i n a c d P e ~ h a d  
n d y  trebled Two a n m r d  fume d idcm were my 
iacd and f a y  wdl quippal. Light t i d m  wcre bein& pducd  
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atthemof 1ooam~1th,mdnewsemi-o1~rif icswcre 
~gtartledoutatthcro#offnertthpn xopooamonth.The 
promranem pwgram was @ d p  gaiain% momentam. 
But ov&awing all odrcr problems, whether of psamel 
or praarcment, was the time factor, Ti was even mare 
viealmthcAmydranth;eNavy,forthetaskof ~~~lvingfrom 
i p c s e t t o o w a r f o o t i n g d d n o t b e ~ ~ ~ ~ + d ~ t  
chaqiag tbe d o l e  nation from a bnsis of p c e t h  pra- 
d d m  m a W of wartinre @don. 
VI. Mobilizing Our Machines 
'War is no longer simply a battle bemcen armed f o m  in 
the field-it is s mt&e in which each side strive8 to bring 
t o b e a r ~ t h e c n r m n y ; c h e c o o ~ ~ p w e r o f  cvcryindi- 
vidual md epery material resource at its command" 
This statement s o d  Qite todayY The cidzen doesn't naed 
to be told that in modem war decdvc i n d d  mob*- 
tion is n decisive facfor-probably the most d&c fa- of 
d. He is only roo well aware of dre need for orgPnizing the 
human and m o l t e d  reswrocs of the m h  But in m931, when 
the statement above appeared in a little 18-page document pre- 
pared by the Wsr Dcqmtmmr, the avcragc cidzw had for- 
pttm many of the kmns learned in the Firsr World War. 
He had forgatten thc c d y  mist&- d delays c a d  by our 
failure to plan in advan=; he had forgotten how we finally and 
paidully worked out the &try for oqpked mass pro- 
duction of war needs. 
The War l l e p m m t ,  howeverf had not forgcmm this ape-- 
ricnce. After 1920, when the tmcqeny machinery disap- 
p e a r a d , i t ~ r ~ t i ~ s t n d y o f t h e a a e d s o f  thenatIan in 
cast of fum emergency. %be National Meme Act of 1920 
~ d r i s w o r l r p a d e ~ d l e ~ d t h e ~ s a m -  
msy of War. The Navy 0 0 o p e r a t o d ~ g h ~ A n r r y  artd
Navy Munitions B o d  
OUR INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES 
Dcspize our p e  national wealth, thc U W  Sleaaw t not 
entidy s e l f 4 b t .  Many em2&tl raw llmmhls ere f d  
within o w  own bodus, But some of the most smtegk 
materials must be imp~d from abroad. For example, we 
' mat  rely on foreign sources for m q p e s e  (escntinI for the 
f production of ad), rubber, tin, tungsten md o&er mace- 
r i a L E . T h e c ~ r n ~ t ~ s h o w s a f e w o f t h e m o s t i m p 0 ~  
produced at home and others we mnm obrain a b d  From 
L,a& America we can bay and are ahead7 buying more of 
somc of these, such as tungsten, tin and antimony. As Lain 
A m a i m  productlo11 expands, we shall be able to obtain 
t i o d  suppk nearby, though not enough to 6ll all rhe gapa 
O n e o f t h e p e a c d m e ~ o f t h e A r m y a n d N a v y M ~ -  
tiom B o d  which worked out the i n d d  m b h h  
plan, was to m c y  oar raw-mataid needs and to plan for 
the building up of against an emergency. hother, 
war more impomt, task was to plan, within rhe h e w o 2 k  
of wr democlgtic form of p~ernmenq for the shift f m  
a peace to P war economy. This involved &g blue- 
prints for the control of prioes, the: regulation of Mushy 
and l k ,  rhe control of foreign acode, and the r e p h i m  
'. of m y  ather phases of our n o d  economic Me. It rrlso 
I called for detailed surveys of Amtricaa iadwtry. The mppb 
list of the h y  co~~tained m r e  than '/ojooo separate itmq 
I many of which were not produced c o d y  in pearxc 
timq the Navy list d a d  for 90- p,ma itetns. In p h h g  
for wartime prmmmat, the Army stweytd topm mgn1~- 
faauring p h o  in all parts of the wmpy and earmarkbd 
about ropeo of thm for emergency war prod& 
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THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AOVIXIRY C B M M I ~ l ~  
The wefuhm of aIl this d m c e  ppmtion was pWy 
shown when President Roosevelt crtated the Nadod 
Defwse Advisory & e m  on hky 28, rw. For, as s 
dtafdthcp lanningdonebpthe~andWavy , ins tead  
o f ~ g h m s c r a t e h t h e ~ m p p s s a b l c t o ~  
its work st the second sage. The Mobiktion P h  called 
far congol, not by the Amy be& but by a civiliaa 
* .  
srrchasrho- 
In appointing the Narionul nefcme Advisory C o d o n ,  
Resideat Rawwelt d e  use of the law pePsbd in 1916 d e r  
which, just before our entry into the h t  World War, M- 
dent ~htl hlad ambed a similar mmmkiaa In theory, the 
new c-m was to act in an advisory apcitp to h 
Cound of Nadod Dtf- body rxrmposed of the Sccre 
raricp of War, Navy, Apidum, Pnteriar, Cammrce and 
Labor. A d y *  aEl the work bas beta done by the Advisory 
C o d ~ n a n d t h e C o u n c i l h a s n i o t ~ ~ n e d ~ a s p a r t  
of the P m s i h d s  C&net, 
The job of the Ddease e O h +  $ Is ~~y 
ded-was to c ~ ~ d h a t e  and orgartize the indamid remms 
of the dm. As fmt set up, however, the t I P e o a  Wf 
had no executive power, It was not d& tu let coamciq 
b d d  plants or lend money for m t i d  defense, but was 
merely to c m ~  the &es of the AmyI Nsmy mil 
other agencies. 
In the bcghiug the (2immrkiotl was q t m k d  under sevcn 
main 'WOIIS with the fallawing fundom: 
The Indast&d Mat& D a  d m  E. R W u s ,  Jr, 
to ~~ockpiles of ~traeegic atlH critical materials, such 
as tin, mngsttn, fkmiumny, etc. 
The Prodzdm D W ,  under Wibm S. Knadscn, to 
amnge proddon of ~ t i a l  &fawe itsm-qhts, 
The T r m p m h  M o n ,  mdcr Ralph bdd, m cacbrdinate 
~ r t a t i o n  of all sapplies of raw materials and 
*a 
The mot. Diddon, tlndtr Sidney HilEman, to mdcc c e d u  
that the factories, fieIds and mines of the nation have a d m  
e*nr ropply d -power md that rbir rmmpnk b 
mined for the tsk and not exploited. 
The Apidncre Division, d e r  Qlsber Davis, to maintain o 
fir reladollship betwee;rt @culM and i n d d  priccR 
The W m  of M e  StpMzdon ,  & Leon Heedersoa, to 
hanrEIe the compIex pmb1egl of price stabihtba 
Xke Dfotisrbn of Consums Proddm, rmder Miss Haffia 
E l l i o t t , t o s t o d y a l l s s p e a s o f t k c d e f c o s e ~ a f f ~  
aollsumen. 
In addition to thee seven msin divisior~ thc Co- 
ercab~d r cmdhatot of national defense pmrhases, a prbd- 
THE US. BUYS MORE PLANES 
ties bard to ssam orderly md prompt delivery of defense 
equipem, a research bureau, a boasing coodbtw, and a 
div~ofstgtepndlocnlcooperntion. 
PR- UNDER THE DEfENSE COMMISSION 
Six months after its atation the ~~ Cmmbion h a d  .B 
report of its activieics which recorded pmgms d q  r ~ l a r r y  
lines. Here are some of the things the Cammbion had w m -  
plished 
ithodel~~redm-rotalingmatban 
10 = & e h z  brnn T h t s e ~ ~ ~ ~ a E s l ~ ~ g e r c e n t ~ f  
themdnedef~progrnmasaptho&dups~thattimcby 
ewgress They included: 
amIw dallara fbt ships: 
I* billion h l h a  for eoastructh of fa#mriQl md h d g :  
l& moa dam tw plpaa d par&; 
d l h  dellam for ammunition; 
p mulion dollam far gum: 
~ m i E l i o n ~ b o r U u d t s a n d t P n l u .  
These ~ c c s ,  plw British a d  other foreign orders, called 
for ptodudon of j a m  Birplmts, 13- Birplane e e s ,  
1 7 ~  heavy guns and the other ittms bed in our table on 
w 52' 
Inthe~dphce,deliverkonthGsecorrwrctswsncbegin- 
r h g  PO come in: h t  2- airplane engines a month; 700 
~~ a month; ~ o o  light e7 r q o m  ~ - ~ ~ E w I I &  rifle; 
md~othuesseneiaIitem& 
& w a s ~ s o b c i n g m a d e i . d . ~ c ~ t o f ~ c ~  
mat&&. A contfact: bad been signed for the dehmy of 
Bolivian tin and ncgothdcm for the comctiDn of domesdc 
tin d t e r s  were under way. FmckpiIcs of fidnmy9 mbber, 
r.lmlqmesc, tarpm, * ole snd other i a d d  raw 
ma&& wem growing 8tc8ay. Produceim of qmhtic sab- 
~ f o r v i t s l m a c t t r i a E a w h k b w e d o n o t ~ u c c i n t h i s  
c o u n t r y 4 b  &%robbcr-was being cacfmqd 
'ME U G  IN PROWCnOt4 
Despite dl the advance phmimg, however, and despite ihe 
edorrs of the Nadonal Ddensc Cmmision, production was 
ruuaing behiad dcdalle. Bath the Chbmmkdon and the Resi- 
dent frankly acfrm,wIedgd the bag. In Daccmt#r rg4o Mr. 
I C n d  revtald that airplane produc&n-thc m a  critical 
item on the k-was 30 pet cent behind the 43mmmmm VS 
tpplier c s t i m m  Thus, bmtd of producing rpcra pLnes s 
math in January 1941, American f a c ~ r i a  wue tarnifig out 
of wMch were being deliverad to 
delays were cwmmhg al l  dong thc 
linc. 
Vdous ressons were given for this lag. In the fmt place, 
I it took many weeks to negdaw the new coetracts, far 
mBPY p h  i n d d e ~  wert d ~ c ~ ~ n t  mpand their PhIS  
I izedtppes of w a r ~ ~ ~ ~ & L E v e a u n d t r  r h e h  cwditiom 
rhis was bound to be a 1% dow procea The machine tool 
iudwzy was fldd wirh orders. And, its out- 
I puthadhcrtmedsoperctntby themdo w a s d  
~ l e r o m t ~ ~ t h e h t a v y d c m a n d ~ u p o n i t . T h e l s c k  
of rnachhle WL was one of the rmvst: d d  bo-k5 dm- 
; I g t h e ~ ~ .  
There wem, Wdes, other reasow for delay. Up nntil 
D e c e ~ d r c g o v ~ h a d g i w l s i m p I y m p d d ~ h n g e  
ddme l a d  on to tht rtgular busin= load, ma had baa 
rdummt a, fom industry tu give priority to its ardclls, 
BodL capital and hbor were chghg m eh& a c m s m d  
the natioa, while still f o l l o ~  
a s ~ ~ t r y i a g t o a c h i e v s m P a s  
war prodaction overnight. Fiaany* Y, l2ummmm . . 
$9 
W l a c k e d t h e c e n ~ a m h 0 ~ t o m t r y a r r t i a S ~ -  
c l l J t a s s l g n m e n t . A s w e h a v e ~ t h c C o ~ m h a d n o  
P"w ta enfarce its ~ d t i o n s ,  and no thgk coordi- 
~ W . I n r h i s ~ i t w a s s h m i t a r m t b ~  
Aclvhry G o W o t t w h i c h  ~~ W h  M appointed 
in 1916, d which had p r o d  SQ .arasttful and btffwtivc. 
I n t 8 c e a d , ~ e n t ~ h a d t o s a o p a W a r ~  
~ r m d e r B e m a r d M . ~ w i d k b 1 n ~ p o w e r s i n  
the wltole field of indugltrisl prod- 
A NEW OBBrIENT 
Sitnilarly, on Decembet ts,I*, President Rmsevelt Paqp 
~ ~ ~ f t h e S h ~ ~ g s a f b i s ~ d e f ~ ~ r g a ? i -  
~ a 0 n t b o r t d a y h c ~ c d E h e ~ o f a n m  
"Oflice for Pdnction Maqem*at k Defuse'' under a 
~ ~ d f o u r m e n t o ~ * e n t i n d c f ~  
~ T Z r t f c n z ~ k e y l n e n w e r e W i U h r m S ~ ~  
Sicby JHillmaa (headof dre~DEvke ion)  andthrrktre 
wrlesofWarandd~tNsvy.Bnlt~vcnihEs 
a single add c d  for 
effort. 
one ~~~~dinornr ,  howem* the Wdczlt gerpe lcaqaal powas 
t o t w o ~ o f t l n e o l d ~ o n - M r . f C a ~ ~ I ( d r .  
H h m . T h i s w a s i n ~ q a a ~ l n v r r g i v c g i V t l a b ~ ~ d  
~ ~ a a e q n a l v o i c e k a E l M d a c i s i r # l s ~ ~  
na- defense p i m b t h  
~ p ~ ~ l ~ o f t f t B n ~ l ~ O ~ O f & o d w i 0 1 ~  
w t r r : f a r ~ t h a n ~ o f t h G d d ~ r C o ~ o a ,  
" X ? h e O P M ~ t o " f ~ a n d ~ ~ a l l ~ g n d  
~ ~ r n ~ ~ d ~ ~ w . I t S  
p o w ~ l g ~ u d c d & ~ w o l d E s ~ i a d ~ p l a w s f o r  
I t h o g u v m m e m . n d m d c d d e w b i o h s b a o l d p m  
Britain d wtkich &odd bc held for tht United  MS. But 
w e n w i t h t h e s e ~ ~ t h e d e f e n s e ~  
was stiU faced with a host of &fBcult pmblarrs, 
Some ob drcse pr0531ms were pnrc1.y tbchnical-how m gct 
~ p h e ~ , ~ ~ ~ g ~ n s , ~ ~ m o r t s h i p " . O t h g t s , h ~ ~ -  
eeer, Paised basic qwxiolls of ecmomic aad polidcal pow. 
For example, how far must w e  readjust the economic life of 
the nation in order to m m  rhe u r p e  d e d  of tad 
defense? Can we get the h c d  output by eapmdig our 
pn!sat p h  ca2J9clty, or mpsr we colrym our 
f w d e s  into tumunmt plane? If we have to convert om 
antcumbile factories aad other matlaf- phts  ia;to I ~ a m w e a d E e d ~ o e r l i v i g g s t a n ~ 3 I n q  cme, h d d  we rely OLI private ind~tptxy to q m d  oar 0- o r ~ t b e g a v ~ s ~ e p m a s ~ d ~ o r d t h o  economy? L= am o k  fimd.mcmol ~ e s t i o u  invol* the ~ ~ I f w e ~ 8 m ' t p y f o r ~ s u t o f o n r  carrlplt hnm, how far can we safely incraw the mdod debt? &nwemkeeffctmc~tosvoidrSsaFiapricesd 
the danger of Mation? Finally, there are thc pmbltfls which 
will a r b  when rhe war is wcr. These seem remore now, but 
whmthewnrisoverwes~fncc~MpmbItmof howm 
adjust oar economic system to a peadmc economy- 
Few of these ~ ~ o n s  ca  be a n s w d  today8 In a period 
of &sazE *, we tX@ w-tdTlg of our on 
"'a swift and driving in- in our armament produ&mW 
T h i s i s t h a ~ i m m ~ E a s k . B m ~ m e ~ e c o n -  
o m i a s a r r : ~ ~ w e a l s o ~ s o m e d l ~ n g h ~ n o w , t o  
formnEatirtg national e c o n d  policies for tbe pcriad bEyond 
t l h e ~ ~ c r i s i s . ~ 6 t l ~ i s t b a t w c m l g h t ~ a p  
an aeanumic pEsneiag mmmit~ee to work with the gcw- 
m ~ n t  d its d h  agencies. New mpc- is not 
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however* as such policies could be worked om jnst ss well by 
&actme team work beman Congress and &sting ddum 
~ ~ i s T n O r e i r n p 0 r t a n t i s ; t h a t w e ~ m r h e f d l  
rhe-mmdin-*aard-- 
d ~ f o r s p e e d i n I : p R O d ~ 8 n d o ~ r s o n n d ,  
strong tx4nIomic systan. 
WL The Final C h o h  
Z n ~ d u d i n g h i s ~ y o f m L i d d t f ~ t e o c i t i z e n i s  . 
m+ed to face the grim r&es of n war which hap that- 
end  our historic &ty. He is forced, however mlucbmdyI 
to reeognh that the thm- d ~ d v e s  of ybmerday have 
been perilously narrowed by events b e y d  o w  bordcm H e  
is no l a p -  passive or unconcerned, for he knows d a y  that 
our own safety and our future will be p f ~ y  n i f d  by 
the onworne of the gigantic straggle in Europe and Asia. But 
many Americans, until very secemly9 have either failed or 
r e f u s e s t o r e c o ~ z h e ~ ~ ~ t d t y o f & t f i c c ~ ~  
to o a r d t y  should cmtml of &emas fall h the hands 
of h d t  m&m. 
In term of wr own d e y ,  the pnmmmt qctcstion con- 
fronting the ~~ people is whether the Un3tdd States can 
permit ~ ) n m l  of the hi* seas to prsssiaro tht b d s  of the 
Axis powcts, The answer cannot be put off for long. If we 
hesitate OF delay, the dceision m y  rest nat with us but with 
Gemmy and Japan. 
In cold lo& oar mmer depends on bow you- an M- 
can citizen-interpret the stmqic factors bmght  out in thig 
sur\ley. We have tried to look at the M c  facts as objmivtly 
as possible. We have pointed out why sea power is the key to 
our mtional security and the key to defeslx of the Wc~oern 
Hemisphere. W e  have soen that rhe United St- Is an Enrmlar 
I 
~ & " E j & t  we imvc b sear liow  cat M*S -I 
z B e s e a s d i t ~ 1 e f o r t h e f r c e a n t i - d & W ~  
to d d a p  d& ~ 0 1 1 ~ ' ' ~  ia peace for 
nearly a cxmtmy~ W e  h socn how our own p b k m  of 
d e f ~ w a s a ~ e l y s i m p l e ~ ~ ~ a ~ a s l a r y r a s ~ d o f t h e  
s a w ~ a d i a f r i e n d l y h a n d s a n d h o w ~ d ~ d  
become if he Weish navy were destroyed 
M ~ r h e s e ~ r s , s o m e ~ b e l i e ~ t t b a t w s  
d d  stin defend our shores and our Wrory evcn if C k -  
many should wrest coasrol of thp seas from Mtah Thcp 
point to the Mculriies which Germany h9s c m m u n d  in 
nybg to cros~ the na d e s  of water between the c c d n a  
ofE~pcandtheBticishIstcs,dthcyaslrhowanyEarop , 
mdoa could cross the Adantic to &ads America, Our -3 
&y, they say, lies in the Wcsretn Hemisphere-mt in Europe 
orAsia.Ourdefenserrrnbcmadtimp~1eifwestayac 
bome9ndboildnpoprnavyandairfoew:b0defead~~ 
and lrZt appmches u, our &ores. 
Wit: thssamebasie factors drive maay 0therAm-to 
thr? epee canclnsioa, If Britain shdd  fall, Ehe Adantic 
w d d  no 10- offer pnp assarance af Sec-nry fur Arne&& 
For even if we codd Mead om shores agakm s frontal attack, 
we would find that we hi lost the b y  to defeagt of thc We- 
umHFdSphffi31Hitler&auldsMxeedia~conffnl 
af the British flea, Gemmy-m tbe Uniaod Smtles-dd be 
in o pmition to c d  he sea lanes to %ath Amdca 
Under snch conditio- the door d d  be open to the d- 
polidad d cconornic penetration of South Am* 
U e d e f s l u c h ~ o a r s a f e r y w a a l d ~ n i r e n ~ ~  
d e f ~ ~ p ~ ~ ~ g w e h a v t ~ ~  
p W  Rather than face such eomditians, our choice &odd b 
r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ w i d s d t h e ~ a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  
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